

communist program

ORGAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY

CONTENTS

- **China: The Bourgeois Revolution Has Been Accomplished, the Proletarian Revolution Remains to Be Made** 1
- **Marxism and Russia** 9
- **Force, Violence and Dictatorship in the Class Struggle (Part III)** 25
- **Angola: From the Victory of the Independence Movement to Bourgeois Normalization** 23
- **A True Solidarity with Lebanon and South Africa** 41
- **The Exploits of University Marxism (Concerning the Works of Messrs. Baran and Sweezy)** 45
- **Party Interventions: Italy, Algeria** 65

WHAT DISTINGUISHES OUR PARTY

is the political continuity which goes from Marx to Lenin, to the foundation of the Communist International and the Communist Party of Italy (Livorno, 1921); the struggle of the Communist Left against the degeneration of the International, the struggle against the theory of « socialism in one country » and the stalinist counter-revolution; the rejection of Popular Fronts and of the Resistance blocs; the difficult task of restoring the revolutionary doctrine and organization in link with the working class, against personal and electoral politics.

communist program

Organ of the International Communist Party

Editorial and business offices : 20, rue Jean-Bouton, Paris-12^e (France).

Subscriptions : 4 Issues

— unsealed : £ 2.00 / \$ 4.00

— closed mail (first-class mail in the U.S.) : £ 3.50 / \$ 7.00.

Payments by check or international money order to F. Gambini.

All correspondence should be sent to the above address.

We wish to apologize to our readers for the late publication of this issue, which was delayed for reasons beyond our control.

China: The Bourgeois Revolution Has Been Accomplished, the Proletarian Revolution Remains to Be Made

Speaking of the vicissitudes of post-revolutionary Russia in the period after 1926 — that period to which Stalin left his name and which deserves to be considered *bourgeois* not only on the economic level but also on the political level (1) — and also referring to the bourgeois democratic revolution which had just triumphed in China under Mao's banner, our party wrote in 1953:

«The bourgeois revolution in China has come on time on its continental area, as did the French Revolution.

«The Russian capitalist revolution took place late in relation to the development of its continental area. It went through the stages exceptionnally fast, arriving at state capitalism.

«Neither one is socialist. Both are digging the grave of world capitalism » (2).

Our decided opposition to the economic and social structure born from the « Maoist revolution » and to its ideological superstructure, and especially to the so-called « Marxism-Leninism » impudently displayed by Peking (as to the fake « Bolshevism » impudently claimed by Moscow) is not in contradiction with the fact that we recognize that the Chinese revolution played a great progressive role in history. Marx and Engels' *Manifesto* is a hymn to the bourgeoisie in so far as it revolutionizes all the economic, social and political relationships of the previous epochs, and arouses gigantic productive forces which until then had been imprisoned in obsolete structures; *at the same time and all the more so* it is a declaration of war to the death against the bourgeoisie on the part of the greatest of the productive forces to which it has given birth, the army of wage laborers, the class of proletarians who

(1) For the Bolsheviks it was clear that the October revolution, which was politically proletarian, nevertheless had to carry out bourgeois economic tasks. It took the Stalinist counter-revolution to cause it to lose its proletarian and communist political characteristics.

(2) *Stalin-Malenkov: toppa, non tappa*, published in no. 6/1952 of *Il Programma Comunista*, our semi-monthly newspaper in Italian.

will be its grave-digger. To take up the words of one of our party works, « *the central condition for the triumph of socialism is capitalism itself, even if the revolutionary party, from its first appearance, leads a relentless war against it and, as the relationship between the forces allows it, climbs the steps which lead from the scientific critique to the opposition in principle, the political polemic and the armed insurrection* » (3). This is precisely the reason why, for a Germany not yet liberated from the pre-capitalist chains, the *Manifesto* assigned to the communist party (just as Lenin will do later for Russia) the task to « *fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty-bourgeoisie* », and at the same time the still more imperative task to « *never cease, for a simple instant, to instill into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straight away use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy* ».

In the same way as the Stalinist counter-revolution of 1926-27 had destroyed the organization, the theory and the program of the proletarian movement and had thereby made it impossible for the proletarian movements of the West to give a resolute aid to the popular and plebeian revolutions of the East, we Marxists recognize that « *in the Asian countries where the patriarchal and feudal type of agrarian economy still prevails* » even « *the political struggle of the 'four classes' is an element contributing to victory in the international communist struggle, even if its immediate result is the establishment of national and bourgeois forces* ». And continuing, « *this is due as much to the formation of new areas where the socialist demands will be on the order of the day as to the blows which these insurrections and revolts deliver to Euro-American imperialism* » (4). But this recognition does not mean and *will never mean* that we renounce our own *independent* party position, that we recant our insistence of the *irreconcilable* antagonism between the two fundamental classes of modern society, or that we adopt the ignoble *interclassist* programmatic and tactical basis, which constitutes the foundation of the Maoist ideology that we denounce, and will never cease from denouncing, because it is precisely the ideology of a *bourgeois* national revolution!

The emancipation from the imperialist yoke, the liquidation of the burden of feudalism, the construction, starting with what was only a colony or semi-colony of world capital, of a united and independent China, the creation of a single national market, the overthrow of the centuries old structures of economic and social relations in the country-

(3) *Le prospettive del dopoguerra in relazione alla piattaforma del Partito*, published in *Prometeo* no. 2, 1946 (reprinted in *Per l'organica sistemazione dei principi comunisti*, Editions *Il Programma Comunista*, Milan, 1973, p. 151).

(4) *Les révolutions multiples*, published in *Le Proletaire* no. 164, January 1974.

side, the construction of the foundations for the expansion of modern industry in a huge country — this is the *revolutionary* side, albeit *bourgeois* revolutionary, of Maoism.

But Maoism pretended at the 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (1956) that the « *People's Democratic Dictatorship* » (read: the revolutionary bourgeois power) was the expression of the interests and aspirations of « *all* » the citizens of the Republic, without taking into account the fact that they belong to this or that class — a claim common to all the bourgeoisies but which Marxism rejects. It has even claimed that it « *has in essence* (!) become a form of the dictatorship of the *proletariat* » before turning this, in the 1974 Constitution, into simply the « *dictatorship of the proletariat* », and even into the first *stage* of communism. Under the guise of bringing Marxism up to date and as a banner to lead the class of industrial and agricultural wage laborers to victory, it launched to the world all the baggage of democratism, gradualism, pacifism, co-existence, and mercantilism which every more or less consistent bourgeois revolution carries with it. It is this which is its incurably *counter-revolutionary* side.

The working class embodied in its revolutionary party and led by it never hesitated, even though it knew that by doing this it would have to give up not only its sweat but also its *blood*, to *applaud and support* the historically necessary achievements of the bourgeois revolutions, even when these revolutions are incomplete, as is always the case when the proletariat is not able to physically play the dominant role. But in spite of this it never accepted to « *sink down to being only an appendage of official bourgeois democracy* » and renounce its task of taking on and defending up to the end « *their position as an independent party* » and « *not allowing themselves to be seduced for a single moment by the hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty-bourgeois* [and the maxims of 'Mao Tse-tung Thought' are nothing but this] *into refraining from the independent organization of the party of the proletariat* », which advances as its own war cry the slogan of the « *Revolution in permanence* » (5).

This therefore explains our position on the Chinese revolution.

However as it is indicated in the passage from our article of 1953 quoted at the beginning, in order to explain the present development of the Chinese revolution it is not sufficient to recognize that it was and is a bourgeois revolution, and without doubt the greatest of this post-war period, a revolution whose social origins are well defined by the worship of the individual, of Mao as the *creator* of history instead of being the instrument of it. It is necessary to add that the combined action of the scourge of the reactionary Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek and the plague of Stalinist opportunism with the

(5) Marx and Engels, *The Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League*, 1850 (*The Karl Marx Library*, vol. 1, *On Revolution*, McGraw-Hill, 1971, pp. 114, 118).

theory of « revolution through stages » which the « great leaders » of Maoism adopted in 1926-27 (and never rejected) made it impossible for the social movement in China to take the path — which in the international situation fifty years ago could have been *short* — of a bourgeois democratic revolution *led up to the end, up to the transformation into a proletarian revolution*. And after the blood bath of 1926-27 — the most horrible which the bourgeoisie, in its entire history, can boast of having inflicted on the workers and peasants who rushed to support it against the ancient regime — the social movement in the 30's had to take up the struggle again starting from deep within rural China, from the economic and political periphery, and follow the long and drawn out tortuous path, the wearisomely protracted march of the « peasant revolution », which reached its aim, the large cities and their central nucleus, Peking, only after long and complex manoeuvring. It follows that the at last established « People's Republic » and the « power of the whole people » (6) saw themselves inevitably prohibited from the possibility of developing on the basis of *large scale* agriculture, and still less on the foundation of *large* modern industry based on the massive and intensive accumulation of capital in the countryside. They had to develop instead on the basis of an agriculture that was extremely small scale with its tiny plots of land, and therefore very backwards, although it was protected in its precarious structure by the existence of a strong single central power rid of the octopus of imperialist domination as well as of the suffocating provincialism of the War Lords, and thus able to ensure, as had been done before in China for thousands of years, the *physical* conditions for the survival of the small and the minute rural enterprises through the regulation and control of the canals in a country-wide system of irrigation.

They were able to accomplish this by rousing the gigantic peasant and even proletarian masses from their age-old slumber and thrusting them into the arena of history, drawing along even some far from negligible strata of « useful bourgeois » (7). Thus they have given *the signal* for the accelerated development of the productive forces and the transformation of semi-colonial China into a great power. But they have not gone beyond the *first* phase of all bourgeois revolutions, something which is only possible by following a tumultuous path on which, up till now, only *some* basic steps have been taken. This first phase can be defined, with all due caution about comparisons with the East (see our 1953 article), as the « French » phase as opposed to the « Russian »: the establishment of small peasant ownership and exploitation limited to the horizon of self-sufficiency, with its stubborn resistance — but a hopeless one because of the impossibility, in the

(6) Established, but not without hesitations, compromises, fears, and often abandonments characteristic of all petty-bourgeois movements, even revolutionary ones.

(7) « Useful » in so far as, contrary to pre-revolutionary Russia, the most advanced wings of the bourgeoisie, small in number but not devoid of energy, had a significant cultural tradition and had struggled with much courage, arms in hand, against feudalism and central and peripheral despotism.

long run, of the ideal of economic self-sufficiency on the peripheral and central level — and with all the secondary effects which this could only have on the destinies of this immense country liberated and unified at last. This is the secret of the convulsions which periodically shake contemporary China *within the very framework of its capitalist transformation*.

From the phase of the very cautious « land distribution » of 1949-1953 up to the so-called « collectivization » with its mutual aid teams and its small and medium size agricultural co-operatives between 1953 and 1958; from the phase of regional regrouping of agricultural co-operatives into communes elevated to the rank of basic socialist units of communist society and combining micro-agriculture with micro-industry (including even micro-ironworks) up to the open acknowledgment in 1962 of the failure of the superhuman effort undertaken to accumulate capital in the countryside on a level sufficient to give an impetus to large-scale industry; and up to the later ups and downs (including the Cultural Revolution, and regardless of what the « leftists » may think) of what could be defined as the idealization, in a petty bourgeois way, of a capitalism that is backwards in the agricultural field (and even more so in the industrial field) but one which strives to surmount its own backwardness by « depending on its own forces », which means pushing the workers of the factories and of the countryside up to the breaking point; from one end to the other the history of the *capitalist* evolution of China since the revolution is only the history of the contradictions inherent in its material basis at the beginning. These are the contradictions between small family agriculture and the unrestrainable thrust towards industrialization. These are the contradictions between, on one hand, the objective necessity of going beyond the *first* stage of the bourgeois upheaval of economic and social relations in the countryside, in order to initiate the *second* stage: the expropriation and concentration of rural enterprises (the cornerstone of a *true and decisive* « leap forward » towards *at least* a Russian-type state capitalism, however much a hybrid it may be between the backwards kolkhose and large scale agriculture) and on the other hand the desperate resistance of the small peasant against this *irreversible* process.

It is the contradiction between the myriad of local economies consuming what they produce and the irruption of mercantile exchanges on an ever increasing level among these economic units and between the city and the countryside. The contradictions among those who make up the fictitious bloc of several classes, contradictions between the large and middle bourgeoisie emerging from the very fabric of micro-agriculture, and the rural petty-bourgeoisie (and mini petty-bourgeoisie), and between these classes and intermediate classes on one side, and the proletariat on the other. The contradictions between the progressive integration of China in the world market and in the « concert » of nations (which has many voices but is without a conductor) and the attempt to protect itself behind the shield of a self-sufficiency

pursued in vain (8). The contradictions between the unrestrainable push in the direction of trade with the outside world and the tendency — becoming more and more weak — towards isolationism.

It is the interplay of these ceaselessly reemerging contradictions which explains the advances and regressions — all punctuated not by natural disasters, but by social and economic ones — of « People's China ». And only Mao's idealistic and petty-bourgeois « romanticism » could hope to resolve this through « consciousness raising », through political pedagogy and through ideological « remoulding », founding all these (since we are supposedly dealing with non-antagonistic contradictions) on the superior harmony of the « whole people ». It is this interplay of contradictions which explains the periodic struggles between rival factions, the appearance and the disappearance on the scene of « historic leaders » suddenly transformed into right and left deviationists. It is the reflection of these contradictions « in the heart of the people » — and therefore in the heart of a regime which confesses, behind its mask, to be incontestably bourgeois — which explains the continual updating of a « Thought » which bases itself however on the *immutable* foundation of inter-classist populism. It is the outburst of these contradictions on the world scene which gives the key to a foreign policy which each time « surprises » and « disorients » more and more the motley but amorphous crew of false « leftists ». And it is this also which explains the apparent paradox of a China which, since it achieved independence and embarked on the path of overcoming its own historic backwardness, became a model for the advanced detachment of peoples of the « Third World », and this at the very moment when, far from declaring war on the imperialist countries, it preached (as it already had done in 1963 in the famous *A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement* which remained the Bible of Maoism) the « principles » of complete *equality* between states, the respect of their territorial *boundaries*, their *sovereignty* and their *independence*, the *non-interference* in the affairs of other countries, the « mutually advantageous » development of trade, and finally « *world peace* », in the first place with the old « paper tiger », American imperialism, and following logically, with the *traditional enemy Japan*. It is also the interplay of these contradictions which explains the no less apparent paradox of a foreign policy which, to the consternation of the « leftists » of all colors, places labels of « anti-imperialist » on the most conservative regimes of Asia and on a Europe united behind the Yankee shield against the U.S.S.R.

It is on the backdrop of these same contradictions that, with Mao's death, the inverted ideological reflection of the clash of material

(8) This attempt without doubt found an impetus in the harsh experience of the avarice with which the U.S.S.R. granted its « aid » to the « sister » Republic who had undertaken an effort of industrialization and modernization analogous to that of the Stalinist Five Years Plans (but even more exhausting). This is only one of the ironies of history for those who believed and still believe in Russian or Chinese « socialism ».

forces projects the disgusting scandalous movie of the struggle between Hua Kuo-feng and the most recent Shanghai « clique », not hesitating to draw out of the stores of a barbarous past the tales of the serpent woman, the fallen angel and heroes changing into rogues, all in order to hide under the veil of « palace conspiracies » and even marital intimacies the harsh reality of antagonisms ceaselessly arising from the capitalist mode of production which laboriously clears a way for itself through these convulsions.

The Chinese revolution was capitalist, *but it has taken place*. Having reached the difficult phase of *consolidation*, China has integrated itself, and integrates itself always more so, as a great power (even if it pretends to be otherwise) in the world system of states: it has its seat in the U.N., it sees all the V.I.P.'s of the world respectfully bow in front of the mortal remains of its Great Helmsman and the most rapacious businessmen flock to Peking to make business deals. The tangle of internal contradictions will not be unraveled by a « Thought » but by the double pressure of the *world market* and the *accumulation of capital* in its countryside and in its cities. The resolution of these contradictions in the direction of *large-scale capitalism* will not be the outcome of peaceful developments, but will be accompanied by new and powerful tremors in the depths of society. This is what the post-Mao period will consist of, a period of which the bourgeois « political pundits » hopelessly sought to find the secret, immediately after the Great Helmsman's death, in the hierarchical order of succession of possible « dauphins » and seek today in the destinies of the new « group in power ». It is from this period (which is in every way consistent with the past one) that the independent class struggle of the Chinese proletariat will arise, called up to avenge the slaughter of 1926-27 in the fire of the communist revolution.

The fact that the gigantic bourgeois revolutionary cycle in the Far East dressed itself in socialist garb, and continues to do so now, is not at all strange or surprising for Marxism which already in 1920 — while the awakening of Asia was setting the horizon ablaze — announced in the Theses of the Third International on the national and colonial question the necessity of a « *determined struggle against the attempt to cloak the liberation movements of the backwards countries in communist colors whereas in fact they are not truly communist* » (an attempt a thousand times repeated in the 20's by the party of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek and logically undertaken by its obvious successor, Mao's Chinese Communist Party). The fact that this revolutionary cycle took the path not only of a *growing integration in the world market* but also of an *accelerated insertion into the sphere of influence of Euro-American capitalism* was so predictable that in the same 1953 article we wrote : « *If China comes out of the revolution seeking a way to accelerate its march towards private capitalism, which it cannot yet gather into a single block manoeuvred by an iron military government — as was done in Russia — it will have to rely on the Western economies* ».

The Chinese *proletarian* and *communist* revolution *still has to be made* and it will be part of a *world-wide* revolution. Far from following the « Thought » of Stalin or of his more or less degenerated inheritors, or the « Thought » of Mao or his more or less orthodox heirs, it will throw them away among the antiquated tools of a dark prehistory. But it will do this with the cry of « *Well dug old mole!* ». The revolutions which have paraded with these two names and which have fed off the proletarian and plebeian blood pitylessly spilled, *create in effect day after day* — and nothing can prevent it — the army of industrial and agricultural proletarians who will throw away not only these derided ideological banners, but also an entire mode of production and an entire society founded on its basis. They create *day after day* the material conditions both for the gigantic battle which this army will have to engage in and for its resounding victory, and they open today an immense field, that of the difficult task of the reconstruction of the class party after the devastations accomplished by opportunism.

The historical justification for these revolutions lies in the following fact *and only in it*: without knowing it and, *even more so* without wishing it, they dig their own grave.

This is the funeral oration which we dedicate to Mao.

Marxism and Russia

Introduction

« *Marxism and Russia* », which is a concentrated analysis and synthesis of the work our party has devoted to the study of Russia, was written in 1957 (1) on the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution. It, however, goes far beyond a commemoration, and this is due to its very method: far from seeing Russia as a local and isolated question, it places it and analyzes it in a historical and international framework and perspective.

Only in this framework and this perspective is it possible to understand not only the revolution in Russia but the counter-revolution as well. Moreover it is because of a lack of this viewpoint, or a loss of it, that many people have seen an « *enigma* » in Russian history which they have sought to resolve in every conceivable kind of way. First we see Gramsci who in 1917 naïvely believed that the Bolsheviks had carried out the « *revolution against Das Kapital* », without realizing that he thus took up the Menshevik position proclaiming the seizure of power in Russia to be « *anti-Marxist* », and without realizing either that his position was a forerunner of the Stalinist pretension of constructing socialism in one country, and a backward country at that. Then there are those who discovered the « *caste* », then the « *bureaucratic class* », or even the « *revisionist clique* », some believing to see socialism in the Russian relations of production but deploring the absence of democracy or of « *humanity* » in the political and social relations, others believing to have discovered a new mode of production there — one which is « *state-run* » or else « *bureaucratic* » — a mode of production unforeseen by a Marxism that is consequently claimed to be antiquated.

(1) It was originally published in no. 21/1957 of our Italian language newspaper *Il Programma Comunista* under the title « *Quarant'anni di una organica valutazione degli eventi di Russia nel drammatico svolgimento sociale e storico internazionale* ».

Even Trotsky did not always succeed in placing the Russian question in its global context. In speaking of his struggle for the permanent revolution, our thesis is not referring to Trotsky's confused opposition to Lenin in 1903-1907, but instead to his struggle in the years 1924-1928 for the international permanence of the revolution, that is the struggle of the Left Opposition — and finally of the entire old Bolshevik guard — to maintain the international perspective of Soviet power. This struggle was wholeheartedly supported by the Communist Left of Italy and we fully claim it as our own today even if we could not accept, from the very first, all the arguments advanced by Trotsky or, with all the more reason today, the development these arguments later followed.

Even though Trotsky fought fiercely to save the international aims of the Russian Revolution, something which he knew to be fundamental, he was unable to follow this to the end and to recognize that what made the October Revolution a true proletarian conquest was fundamentally its character as the vanguard battle of the international struggle for Communism. He failed to see that from the moment when the Russian state «renounced» its mission in service to the world revolution, and thus to the goals of revolutionary Marxism, it lost all of its proletarian character, and that from this point on, since no feudal restoration threatened the bourgeois democratic conquests of October, the proletariat no longer had ANYTHING to defend in Russia. In short, in spite of Trotsky's unswerving struggle for internationalism, his incapacity to break completely with the Russian state led him to fall back, to lose the historical and international perspective; thus on the one hand this led him to understand the Russian events less and less, and on the other caused him to contribute — through false theorizations as well as through the «frontism» with the USSR and the C.P.'s — to the disarray and disorganization of the proletarian vanguard.

To re-establish the historical and international framework and perspective of the October Revolution, it was first necessary to clarify the history of Russia up to present time and, just as it was necessary for the Marxists of a century ago, «to refute the fallacious position according to which the deductions of historical materialism could not be applied to Russia». We said in 1951 in «Lessons of the Counter-Revolution» that «the analysis of the counter-revolution in Russia [...] is not a central problem for the strategy of the proletarian movement in the renewal of the struggle we are expecting» (2); this is precisely because this analysis, far from providing some kind of revelation or pretended discovery, could only be soundly undertaken on the basis of a Marxism that has been restored in its entirety. We have therefore demonstrated that our doctrine explains the history of the counter-revolution as well as that of the revolution; that our material defeat under the blows of the world counter-revolution, the consequences of which we still suffer from, was accompanied by a theoretical victory; and that far from revealing «errors» or even «insufficiencies» in

(2) «Leçons des contre-révolutions», Programme Communiste no. 63, p. 12.

Marxism, history has instead completely confirmed it. But this explanation and this confirmation go far beyond the «Russian problem» and the study of the past: they imply the perspective of the future international revolutionary upsurge.

It is towards this «new flare-up of the permanent revolution seen in the international perspective» that we have directed our study of the Russian events as well as all of our activities. And it is for this reason that this work has not commemorated the past forty years of the triumph of the counter-revolution, but the twenty years to come of revolutionary preparation and their culmination. We must recognize that our prediction as to the length of time separating us from this conflagration — a prediction which had seemed excessively pessimistic to those who wished at all costs to see the revolution in the smallest social disturbances and desperately expected it from one day to the next — this prediction was still too optimistic.

If the first general crisis of world capitalism since World War II, marking the end of the post-war period of expansion, has actually occurred in 1975 — that is to say, very near the time we had predicted in 1957 — it is far from having the expected consequences. What has occurred is just a tremor preliminary to the earthquake. The political crisis, that is to say the development of significant class struggles of the proletariat and the return of proletarian groups to Marxist positions, still lags behind the economic crisis.

This fact, as we have explained in «Once Again on Crisis and Revolution» (3), does not however constitute a negation of our forecast of 1957, which in any case did not pretend to mathematically calculate the date of the revolution. Its objective was rather to set a minimum delay before which it would be illusory to expect a general renewal of the proletarian struggle. For after the complete destruction of the proletariat's class movement through the work of the counter-revolution, Stalinism and its aftermath, and through the proletariat's participation in the second Imperialist War, in the reconstruction and in the world-wide development of capitalism, it had become necessary first of all for an economic crisis to materially break the collaboration between classes before such a renewal of the struggle and a return to Marxist positions could be possible.

But at the same time that our text opposed itself to an activist voluntarism which in the hope of «forcing» and «accelerating» history seeks tactical expedients which in the end lead to opposite results, at the same time that it recalled this objective condition and this minimum delay, it also opposed itself to a fatalist pacifism and recalled the subjective conditions for a victorious revolutionary struggle: the theoretical and organizational restoration — well before the renewal of the struggle — of a world communist party, a party which to the great

(3) Communist Program no. 1, October 1975.

indignation of the democrats of all stripes « does not hesitate to propose its own dictatorship ».

The evaluation of the Russian events therefore must organically lead to a call for the preparation of the revolution and consequently for the preparation of the party of the revolution. And this is also how we must understand the statement that if the next historical wave of the revolution does not lead to a victory in Europe « the last Marxist will have disappeared ». This does not mean that the history of humanity will stop there. Neither does it mean simply that an unprecedented repression will exterminate us up to the last. Such a repression would be the penalty for the incapacity exhibited on our part. This eventuality would therefore signify a terrible statement of the impotency and the failure of our movement, which would find itself historically « disqualified », and consequently would signify a rupture in the continuity of the communist movement which would be much more severe than that resulting from the defeat of the previous revolutionary wave.

This harsh warning therefore reminds us of our tasks and responsibilities. It is today that we must prepare the revolution of tomorrow, we must profit from the relative delay of the social crisis in order to make up for the still greater delay of our preparation. This warning must remind us that we must do all we possibly can to reinforce the party and to link it solidly to the vanguard of the working class. This we must do without voluntarism but with an inflexible will, without activism but with an untiring activity, both based on the principles of revolutionary communism.

Marxism and Russia

A. Russia Against Europe in the 19th Century

1. The objective of one of the first battles waged by Marxist socialists in regard to the « role » of Russia in European politics was to refute the fallacious position according to which the deductions of historical materialism could not be applied to Russia. The universally valid social deductions which Marxist internationalism drew from its study of the first capitalism, England, were generalized and applied to France, Germany and the United States. Our school never doubted that in Russia the same key would open that door which had seemed to be closed forever in the face of bourgeois society with the rout of Napoleon's bayonets, an event which retarded historical development for a century.

2. For Russia just as for the other European countries, Marxism expected and urged the great Russian bourgeois revolution which would follow the path of the English and French revolutions, just as the one in 1848 which inflamed and shook all of Central Europe. Marx ardently expected, awaited and advocated the upheaval of the feudal mode of production in Russia, all the more so because in his eyes the land of the Tsar played the role of the bulwark of anti-liberal and anti-capitalist reaction in Europe. In the period of wars aiming at the constitution of bourgeois national states in Europe, a period which ended in 1871, each war was appraised by Marxism according to its ability to bring about a defeat and disaster to St.Petersburg. And for this position Marx was even accused of being an agent of anti-Russian pan-Germanism! For him, as long as Tsarism stood it would constitute a barrier not only to the bourgeois revolutionary wave, but also to that which would follow, the wave of the European proletarian revolution; and the First International gave its total support to the liberation movements of the nationalities oppressed by the Tsar, as is shown by the classical example of Poland.

3. In the historical doctrine of Marxism, the period in which socialists supported wars for the constitution of modern states, struggles for national liberation, and liberal revolutions closes for Europe in 1871. On the horizon stood the obstacle of Russia which as long as it remained would always bar the route of the proletarian insurrection against « the confederated national armies », sending its Cossacks to defend not only Holy Empires, but the capitalist parliamentary democracies as well, whose cycle of development in the West had been completed.

4. Marxism concerned itself with the social questions of Russia very early, studying its economic structure and the development of class contradictions. This did not mean that it was not necessary to take into account, in the first place, the international balance of power in order to determine the cycle of social revolutions such as Marx did in his tremendous construction on the stages of the revolution, the conditions of which, as regards the maturity of the social structure, manifest themselves precisely on the international scale. Immediately, therefore, a question is posed: was it possible to shorten the historical development in Russia, which had not yet reached the level attained by Europe at the beginning of the 19th Century and in 1848? Marx answered this question in 1877 in a letter to a periodical and in 1882 in the preface to Plekhanov's translation of the *Communist Manifesto* in Russian. Was it possible for Russia to *leap over* the capitalist mode of production? The answer to this last question was in part positive: yes, « *if the Russian revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both [revolutions] complement each other* » (1). But in his first answer (1877), pointing to the bourgeois agrarian reform of 1861 and the abolition of serfdom (a reform which Bakunin, harshly criticized by Marx and Engels, had praised but which

(1) Marx's and Engels' preface to the second Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, 1882.

instead signified the final dissolution of the primitive communism of the Russian village) Marx said that this possibility was already in the course of being lost: « *If Russia continues to walk along the path it has followed since 1861, it will lose the best chance history has ever offered a people and will suffer all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime [...] once it has entered the womb of the capitalist regime it will suffer its ruthless laws, as other peoples have* » (2). That is all, Marx bluntly concludes. And that, effectively, was all — with the failure and betrayal of the proletarian revolution in Europe, present-day Russia has fallen into capitalist barbarism. Some writings of Engels on the old rural Russian commune (the *mir*) show that in 1875 and still more in 1894 (3) the upper hand seemed to have been won for the capitalist mode of production which from then on dominated the cities and, in part, the Russian countryside, and all this under Tsarist rule.

5. Along with capitalist industry which in Russia was born from direct state investments rather than from a primitive accumulation, there appeared the urban proletariat and the Marxist working-class party. Like the first Marxists in Germany before 1848, this party was confronted with the problem of the double revolution. Its theoretical positions, represented in the first period by Plekhanov and then by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, are in full accord with European and international Marxism, most importantly on the agrarian question which is of prime importance in Russia. In this double revolution, what will be the contribution of the rural classes, of the extremely impoverished serfs and peasants who legally have been emancipated but whose conditions of life have grown worse than those they knew under feudalism proper? Throughout the world, the serfs and small peasants supported the bourgeois revolutions and revolted against the privileges of the landed nobility. In Russia, the feudal mode presented the particularity of not being centrifugal as had been the case in Europe and in particular in Germany. The central state power and the national army itself had been centralized in Russia for several centuries, which, up to the 19th Century, was a historically progressive condition. This centralization had been established not only on the political level — as concerns the origin of the army, the monarchy and the state, whose forms were imported from outside Russia — but also on the level of the social structure. The state and the Crown (and certain religious institutions which were no less centralized) owned more land and serfs than the feudal nobility. From this fact comes the Marxist definition of Russia as *state feudalism*, a state feudalism which so well withstood the attacks of the French democratic army that Marx for years went as far as to call upon the intervention of European, Turkish and German armies to destroy it.

(2) Marx's letter to the editor of *Otchestvennie Zapiski*, November 1877.

(3) This refers to Engels' article *Soziales aus Russland* (1875) and his post-script in 1894 to this same article.

In short, the passage from state feudalism to state capitalism in Russia proved to be shorter than the European passage from molecular feudalism to centralized capitalist states and from the first autonomous capitalism to a concentrated and imperialist capitalism.

B. The Perspectives for the Demise of the Last Feudalism

6. These age-old forms explain why a bourgeois class comparable in strength to the Western bourgeoisies never formed in Russia. Consequently the grafting of the proletarian revolution onto the bourgeois revolution as Marxists expected seemed to be even more difficult in Russia than in Germany. Approaching the problem of the weakness of the German revolutionary tradition which, contrary to what occurred in England, was completely exhausted in the religious reformation, Engels retraced the peasants' historic war of 1525 and their terrible defeat that resulted from the cowardice of the urban bourgeoisie, the reformed clergy and also the small nobility. In Russia, where the bourgeois class was politically absent, as was the small nobility, and where a rebellious clergy was lacking, could the task of the bourgeoisie be fulfilled instead by the peasantry? Such was the first point on which Marxists entered into struggle, both theoretically and practically, against all the other parties. According to the historical scheme of our adversaries, the Russian Revolution would be neither proletarian nor bourgeois, but peasant. As for us, we defined the peasant revolution as simply the other side of the urban bourgeois revolution. In the course of a century of polemics and class wars, Marxism never ceased to take exception to the monstrous perspective of a « peasant socialism ». Our adversaries pretended that in Russia such a socialism would rise out of a movement of small peasants for a utopian egalitarian division of the land; the impotence of the bourgeoisie and the factor of a young proletariat would, according to them, allow the poor peasantry to take state control instead of the urban classes. They did not reckon with the formidable energy which the Russian working class drew from its position as a section of the European proletariat. The bourgeoisie is born as a national class and does not transfer energy to itself beyond borders. But the proletariat is born as an international class and as a class participates in all « foreign » revolutions. As for the peasantry, it does not even attain the national level.

It is on these foundations that Lenin elaborated the Marxist doctrine of the Russian Revolution in which, setting aside the indigenous bourgeoisie and the peasantry, he assigned the principal role to the proletariat.

This subject is developed in our text *Russia and Revolution in the Marxist Theory* (4).

(4) « Russia e rivoluzione nella teoria marxista », *Il Programma Comunista* nos. 21/1954 to 8/1955.

7. There are two great questions of the Russian revolution: the agrarian question and the political question. In regard to the first, the Social Revolutionary Populists were for the division of the land, the Mensheviks for municipalization, and the Bolsheviks for nationalization. All these platforms, according to Lenin, are those of a bourgeois democratic revolution, not a socialist one. Yet the third one is the most advanced and creates the best conditions for proletarian communism. Let us once again cite Lenin: « The idea of nationalization of the land is then a category belonging to the mercantile and capitalist society ». In the Russia of today, only that part of agriculture organized into *sovkhoses*, which is the smallest part, is at this stage; the rest is still more backward.

As regards the question of power, the Mensheviks held the position of allowing the bourgeoisie to seize power and then of passing into the opposition — and in 1917 they collaborated in the government alongside the bourgeoisie. The populists were for an illusory peasant government — with Kerensky they ended up doing the same as the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks were for seizing power and establishing a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. The adjective « democratic » and the noun « peasantry » are explained by the following words of Lenin: « Such a victory will not yet by any means transform our bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution »; « the social and economic reforms that have become a necessity for Russia do not in themselves imply the undermining of capitalism [...] on the contrary, they will for the first time really clear the ground for a wide and rapid European, and not Asiatic, development of capitalism »; « such a victory will enable us to rouse Europe; after throwing off the yoke of the bourgeoisie, the socialist proletariat of Europe will in its turn help us to accomplish a socialist revolution » (5).

How then are we going to deal with the peasant « allies »? Lenin's response is just as clear. Marx had said that the peasants are « the natural allies of the bourgeoisie ». Lenin writes: « [in the genuine and decisive struggle for socialism] the peasantry, as a landowning class, will play the same treacherous, instable part as is now being played by the bourgeoisie in the struggle for democracy » (6).

As we have shown at the end of *Russia and Revolution in the Marxist Theory* (7), Lenin's program was the seizure of power and dictatorship by the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, against the bourgeoisie itself and with the support of the peasants alone. He supported this with two arguments: first of all the necessity of realizing the proletarian revolution in Europe, a condition without which socialism could not be victorious in Russia; and secondly the necessity of avoiding a Tsarist restoration which would mean the restoration of the White Guard of Europe.

(5) Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, 1905. Works, vol. 9, pp. 57, 48, 82.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 136.

(7) *Il Programma Comunista* no. 8/1955.

C. The Unforgettable Russian Epic of the World Proletarian Revolution

8. In 1914 the war Marx had foreseen between Germany and a coalition of the Latin and Slavic races broke out, and as he had predicted the Russian Revolution arose out of the Tsar's defeats.

Russia was then allied with the democratic powers of France, England and Italy. The capitalists and the democrats, as well as the renegade socialists who had embraced the cause of the anti-German war, considered that the Tsar had become an enemy to overthrow because they thought he was incapable of conducting the war or else because they suspected him of secretly preparing an alliance with the Germans. For these reasons the first Russian Revolution, that of February 1917, was welcomed with the applause of all patriots, democrats as well as socialists, who attributed it less to the fact that the masses and in particular the soldiers could endure no more, than to the clever manoeuvres of the allied embassies. Although not having in their majority supported the war, the right-wing Russian socialists immediately turned towards the creation of a provisional government which would *continue* the war in alliance with the foreign powers, and it is on this basis that they laid down a compromise with the bourgeois parties.

With hesitations at first, then wholeheartedly after the return of Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders in 1917 and with Trotsky's total support, the Bolshevik party set itself to the task of overthrowing this government that was supported by the Mensheviks and the Populists.

In our work on *The Economic and Social Structure of Russia Today* (8), particularly in the first part, we made use of the documents of the period in order to demonstrate the historical facts which led to the second revolution, that of October, the 40th anniversary of which is being celebrated today. In this work we viewed the struggle for power in 1917 in the light of the doctrinal questions which had previously appeared in the party's life.

9. The conquest of power by the Communist Party was manifested in the defeat in the civil war of *all* other parties, bourgeois as well as the so-called workers and peasant parties, who supported Russia's continuation of the war on the side of the allies. This conquest was completed by the following: the defeat of these parties in front of the Bolsheviks in the All-Russian Soviet, which was a continuation of the defeat suffered in the street-battle by them along with their allies outside the soviets; the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly that had been convoked by the Provisional Government; and finally the Bolsheviks' rupture with their last ally, the Left Social-Revolutionaries,

(8) « Struttura economica e sociale della Russia d'oggi », *Il Programma Comunista* nos. 10/1955 to 12/1957 — Reprinted in book form by *Edizioni Il Programma Comunista*, Milan, 1975.

who had a strong influence in the countryside and who supported the *Holy War* against the Germans.

This gigantic turn in history did not take place without serious struggles within the party and it was historically concluded only after four years of a devastating war that ended with the defeat of the counter-revolutionary armies drawn from three camps: the forces of the feudal nobility and the monarchy; the forces which Germany had roused up in 1918 both before and after the Brest-Litovsk peace; and finally the forces, among them the Polish army, which had been mobilized with the greatest zeal by the democratic powers.

During this time, in the European countries, there was only an unsuccessful series of attempts to seize power by the working class which was ardently in solidarity with the Bolshevik Revolution. The decisive event was essentially the defeat of the German Communists in January 1919, after the military defeat of Germany and the fall of the Kaiser. This was the first serious rupture in the historical progression of events envisioned by Lenin which up until then was magnificently realized, especially with the Bolsheviks' acceptance of peace in March 1918, a decisive step which the democratic world stupidly qualified as treason. The following years would confirm that the Russian economy, fallen into a terrible disorganization, did not receive the aid of a victorious proletariat. Later on in Russia power was firmly defended and preserved; but already it was no longer possible to settle the economic and social question in Russia according to the perspective of all Marxists, that is to say by the dictatorship of the international communist party over the productive forces which, in Europe, remained over-abundant even after the war.

10. Lenin had always denied — and he denied it up to his death as did true Marxist Bolsheviks — that the Russian social structure could be transformed to the point of taking on socialist characteristics if the Russian Revolution did not spread to Europe and therefore if the European economy remained capitalist. That did not prevent him from always insisting that in Russia power must be seized and held under a dictatorial form by the party of the proletariat supported by the peasants. Two historical questions pose themselves. First of all, can one define as socialist a revolution which, as Lenin had predicted, creates a power which is obliged, since new international victories have not yet come, to govern social forms of private economy while waiting for these victories? And secondly how long can one admit that such a situation can last, and were there other possible outcomes than an open political counter-revolution and the return to power of an undisguised national bourgeoisie?

For us, October was socialist. But in the absence of a military victory of the counter-revolution two possibilities, not one, remained open: either the apparatus of power (the state and the party) would degenerate from within and adapt itself to the administration of capitalist forms while openly *renouncing* its wait and expectation of the world revolution (this is what actually happened); or the Marxist

party would maintain itself in power for a long period, *devoting itself expressly to supporting* the revolutionary proletarian struggle in all foreign countries and declaring with the same courage as Lenin that the social forms remained largely capitalist (and even pre-capitalist) in Russia.

It is necessary to first deal with this first question. The second is linked to an examination of the present day Russian social structure which is falsely presented as socialist.

11. The October Revolution must not be considered in the first place from the perspective of immediate or very rapid transformations of the forms of production and economic structure, but instead as a phase of the international political struggle of the proletariat. It presented in effect a series of important features which totally cross the limits of a national and purely anti-feudal revolution and which are not simply limited to the fact that it was led by a proletarian party.

a) Lenin had shown that the European and World War would have an imperialist character « for Russia included » and that the proletarian party must consequently openly practice defeatism, as it had done in the Russo-Japanese War which provoked the outbreak of the struggles of 1905. This was so not because the Russian state was not a democratic one but because of the same reasons that dictated the same duty to all the socialist parties in other countries. The development of the capitalist and industrial economy in Russia was insufficient to furnish a base for socialism, but it was sufficient to give an imperialist character to the war. The traitors to revolutionary socialism who had espoused the cause of the imperialist brigands under the pretext of defending a democracy elevated to the rank of an absolute — here against the German danger, there against the Russian danger — disavowed the Bolsheviks for *putting an end to the war* and for liquidating the war alliances, and tried to stab the October Revolution. But in spite of them the October Revolution triumphed over war and world imperialism and this was a purely proletarian and communist conquest.

b) In defeating these renegades October took up the forgotten principles of the revolution and restored the Marxist doctrine of which they plotted the ruin. For *all nations* it showed the way of victory over the bourgeoisie: the use of violence and revolutionary terror, the contempt of democratic « guarantees », the unlimited use of that essential Marxist principle, the dictatorship of the working class exercised by the Communist Party. It forever abandoned to their own imbecility those who see in the dictatorship the power of one man, and for all the more reason those who, dreading this tyranny as do all the democratic prostitutes, admit only the power of an amorphous and unorganized class, a class that is not constituted *into a political party* such as our texts have openly declared for a century.

c) Although the working class seems to appear on the political scene, or even worse on the parliamentary scene, divided into several parties, the never denied lesson of October showed that the revolutionary

way cannot mean the exercise of power in common with all these servants of capitalism but instead it requires their violent liquidation, one after the other, until total power is held by the single party.

The importance of the three above points resides in the fact that precisely in Russia an *exception* in regard to the developed bourgeois countries could perhaps be accounted for by reason of a particular historical condition — the survival of medieval despotism. But either to the horror or the applause of the world, what the Russian way confirmed was instead the only and universal way laid down by the universal Marxist doctrine from which neither Lenin, nor with him that admirable Bolshevik party, ever deviated for one moment, either in thought or in action.

And who exploits these great names? It is they who in excusing the *ways* which Russia was « obliged » to take because of pretendedly particular circumstances and local conditions, reveal the disgusting shame that is aroused in them by these great names which they make a big show of praising. It is the people who — as if it was their mission, as if they only had the power — assure us or allow the possibility that the other countries will attain socialism by different ways, by national ways each one different from the other. And these ways have been paved through their betrayal and their infamy with all the slime that could be found in the opportunist cess pool: liberty, democracy, pacifism, co-existence and competition. What a disgusting spectacle!

For Lenin, the revolution in the West was the oxygen that was indispensable for socialism in Russia. For those gentlemen who parade in front of Lenin's stupid mausoleum on November 7th, oxygen is that capitalism should continue to feast in the rest of the world so that they can continue to co-exist and fornicate with it.

D. The Grim Course of the Truncated Revolution

12. The second question to examine was that of Russia's economic structure at the time of the October victory. The groundwork of the question was established by Lenin in some of his basic writings, which we consulted and made extensive reference to, not contenting ourselves with some out-of-context quotations which can be introduced in short and general articles, but placing all his statements in relation to the historical conditions and to the relations of power seen in their historical development.

In the Russian Revolution, as it was a « double revolution », three historical modes of production were set on the stage, just as in pre-1848 Germany where the classic Marxist analysis recognized three contending forces: the medieval aristocratic-military empire, the capitalist bourgeoisie, and the proletariat — in other words serfdom, wage labor, and socialism. The industrial development of Germany was limited

then, in quantity if not in quality, but if Marx introduced the third player (the proletariat) it was because the technical-economic conditions of the third mode of production already fully existed in England while the political conditions seemed present in France. On the European scale a socialist perspective did exist. The idea of a rapid fall of the absolutist power in Germany in favor of the bourgeoisie and of a subsequent attack of the young proletariat against the latter was linked to the possibility of a proletarian victory in France where, after the fall of the bourgeois monarchy in 1831, the Parisian and provincial proletariat was to engage in a courageous battle which it unfortunately lost.

Great revolutionary visions are fertile even when history postpones their realization. In Marx's perspective, France was to have given the political basis with the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship in Paris, as was attempted in 1831 and 1848 and as was accomplished in 1871, afterwards perishing gloriously one more time with arms in hand. England was to have given the economic basis. Germany was to have given the doctrine, the same doctrine which Leon Trotsky referred to in taking up for Russia the classic expression of *the revolution in permanence*. But for Marx as for Trotsky, the permanence of the revolution can only be realized on the international scale, not on the miserable scale of the nation. In their ideological terrorism, the Stalinists condemned the permanent revolution — but it was they who mimicked it in an empty parody, dirtied with patriotism.

In Lenin's perspective (and with all of us following him) revolutionary Russia — industrially as backwards as Germany in 1848 — was in 1917 to hold up the flame of political victory and relight in all its splendor that doctrine which had grown in strength in Europe and the world. Defeated Germany would have furnished the productive forces, the economic potential. The rest of tumultuous Central Europe would have followed. A second wave was to have submerged the « victors » of France, Italy (where we hoped in vain to see the revolution as early as 1919), England, the United States, and Japan.

But in the central European and Russian nucleus, the development of the productive forces in the direction of a socialist mode of production was not to have encountered obstacles and was to only have needed the dictatorship of the Communist parties.

13. In this short outline of the results of our work we must now consider the *other* possible outcome, that of Russia remaining all alone with its brilliant political victory in hand. This would have been a situation of enormous advantage in relation to 1848 when all the nations that engaged in the struggle remained under capitalist rule, with Germany more backwards still.

Let us recall the principal features of Lenin's home policy in the expectation of a revolution in the West. In industry it was the control of production and later, management by the state: this would signify the destruction of the private bourgeoisie and therefore political victory for the proletariat, but on the other hand it would be an economic

administration within the framework of a mercantile and capitalist mode of production, which was only developing the « foundations » of socialism. In agriculture it was the destruction of all forms of feudal subjugation and the creation of a co-operative management of large holdings, with the least possible tolerance for small-scale mercantile production, which in 1917 was the dominant form and had been inevitably encouraged by the destruction (and in this case not only political but economic) of the feudal mode of production. Even the landless agricultural workers, the only « poor peasants » truly dear to Lenin, had diminished in numbers — the expropriation of the rich peasants had transformed them into *landowners*.

The question of how long this situation would last rose up in the great discussion of 1926. Stalin said: if it is true that full socialism is impossible here then we must abandon power. Trotsky insisted that he believed in the international revolution, but that it was necessary to wait for it while remaining in power, even if it was necessary to wait fifty more years. Trotsky was answered that for an isolated Russia Lenin had spoken of twenty years. We have shown that in reality Lenin spoke of twenty years « of good relations with the peasants », after which, even if Russia had not yet become socialist economically, the class struggle would break out between the workers and peasants in order to break up rural micro-production and agrarian private micro-capital, the true gangrene of the revolution.

But in the hypothesis of the European proletarian revolution, the micro-possession of the land — which under its present « kolkhosian » form is *ineradicable* — would have undergone a drastically swift treatment without any delay.

14. Marxist economic science allows it to be demonstrated that Stalinism had not even reached the stage that Lenin saw as a far-away result. It is not twenty, but forty years which have elapsed, and the relations with the kolkhoz peasants are as « good » as the relations with the industrial workers are « bad ». Industry is managed by the state under a regime of wage labor and under mercantile conditions which so far are even worse than those existing in *uncamouflaged* capitalisms. The kolkhoz peasant is well treated as a co-operator of the kolkhoz enterprise — which is a private and not state capitalist form — and, better yet, as a small manager of the land and capital.

It is needless to recall the bourgeois characteristics of the Soviet economy, which go from commerce to inheritance and savings. Just as this economy is not at all proceeding towards the abolition of exchange between monetary equivalents and the non-monetary remuneration of labor, likewise the relations between workers and peasants go in a sense opposed to the abolition — which characterizes communism — of the difference between agricultural labor and industrial labor, between manual labor and intellectual labor.

Forty years separate us from 1917 and about thirty separate us from the date when Trotsky estimated that the length of time during

which it would be possible to remain in power would be fifty years (which would carry us to around 1975) and the revolution in the West has not come. The assassins of Leon Trotsky and of Bolshevism have largely constructed capitalism in industry, that is to say the foundations of socialism. But this has only been done in a limited way in agriculture and they are still twenty years behind Lenin's twenty years as concerns the liquidation of the stupid kolkhosian form, that degeneration of classical liberal capitalism itself with which, in an unspoken agreement with foreign capitalists, they would like to-day to infect industry and all aspects of life. It will not be necessary to wait until 1975 to see the crises of production unfurling on the two competing camps, sweeping away the bales of hay, the chicken houses, the little individual garages, and all the miserable creations of the repugnant kolkhosian domestic ideal, that modern Arcadian illusion of populist capitalism.

15. In a recent study by American bourgeois economists on the world dynamic of trade, it was calculated that the present race for the conquest of markets (which after the second world conflict was concealed behind the shady Puritanism of « helpful » America) will reach its critical point in 1977. Twenty years still separate us from the new flare-up of the permanent revolution seen in the international perspective, which coincides with the conclusions of the distant debate of 1926 as well as with the result of our work during these last years.

In order to avoid a new proletarian defeat, it is indispensable that the theoretical restoration of Marxism must not wait until the third world conflict has already rallied the workers behind all their cursed flags (which was the situation that confronted Lenin and necessitated his tremendous effort after 1914). This restoration must be developed well before, with the organization of a world party that does not hesitate to propose its own dictatorship. Any hesitation on this point is equivalent to liquidation. We can see this in the flocks who explain Russia by means of palace revolutions, the work of great men or traitors, demagogues or other swashbucklers.

In the course of these fateful twenty years, we will see a great crisis of world industrial production and of the commercial cycle, a crisis comparable in depth to the American crisis of 1932 but which will not spare Russian capitalism this time. This crisis will be able to constitute the basis for the return of resolute proletarian minorities — no longer microscopic — on Marxist positions that will have nothing to do with the apologies of those anti-Russian pseudo-revolutions of the Hungarian type, where peasants, students, and workers fight side by side in the interclassist Stalinist way.

Can we venture a projection of the future international revolution? Its central arena will consist of the countries which responded to the ruins of World War II with a powerful upsurge of productive forces, in the first place Germany (including East Germany), Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The proletarian insurrection, which will proceed with the ferocious expropriation of all the possessors of capital (which is

presented as being «in the hands of the people») would have its epicentre between Berlin and the Rhine, and would rapidly draw northern Italy and northeast France into the movement.

Such a perspective is not accessible to the weak of spirit who do not want to grant an hour of relative survival to any of the capitalisms, which to them are all equal in strength and should be executed *en masse*, even if the only weapons they have are old rifles instead of atomic missiles!

Looking at Russia confirms that Stalin and his successors have industrialized that country in a revolutionary way at the same time that they have mutilated the world proletariat in a counter-revolutionary way; and Russia will be a reserve of productive forces for the future revolution, and only later a reserve of revolutionary armies.

After the third revolutionary wave, continental Europe will have become Communist politically and socially, or the last Marxist will have disappeared.

British capitalism has already burned its reserves which enabled it, as Marx and Engels showed, to bourgeoisify the workers in a labourist way. This time, even American capitalism, ten times more vampiric and oppressive, will in its turn lose its reserves in the supreme confrontation. For the repugnant peaceful *emulation* of today will be substituted the struggle to death between the antagonistic social classes.

16. This is why our commemoration is addressed not to the past forty years, but to the twenty years to come and their culmination.

Force, Violence and Dictatorship in the Class Struggle

III. The Democratic Form and the Fascist Form of Bourgeois Rule

This work examines the extent to which force is used in social relationships, distinguishing between the two forms in which violence is manifested: the open manifestations which are carried out up to the point of the massacre; and the mechanism of social rules which are obeyed by the affected individual or group without physical resistance, due to the threat of punishment inflicted on offenders or, in any case, due to the predisposition of the victims to accept the norms which rule over them.

In the first chapter we have established a comparison between the two types of manifestation of energy in the social domain and the two forms in which energy is manifested in the physical world: the actual or kinetic form (or energy of motion) which accompanies the collisions and explosions of the most varied agents; and the virtual or potential form (or energy of position) which even if it does not produce such effects plays just as great a role in the collection of events and relationships under consideration.

This comparison — developed from the field of physics to that of biology, then to that of human society — has been carried out with brief references to the course of historical epochs. Arriving at the present bourgeois capitalist period we have shown that in this period the play of force and violence in the economic, social, and political relationships between individuals and above all between classes not only has an enormous and fundamental role but — inasmuch as we can measure it — becomes much more frequent and widespread than in previous epochs and pre-capitalist societies.

In a more exhaustive study we could use a social-economic measurement if we try to translate into figures the value of human labor extorted to the benefit of the privileged classes from the great masses who work and produce. In modern society there is a constant decrease in the proportion of individuals and economic groupings which succeed in living in their own autonomous cycle, consuming what they

Parts I and II of this article, which originally appeared in our review *Prometeo* between 1946 and 1948, were published in *Communist Program* no. 1.

produce without external relationships. Simultaneously there has been an enormous increase in the number of those who work for others and who receive a remuneration that compensates them for only a part of their work; likewise there has been an enormous increase in the social gap between the living standard of the great productive majority and that of the members of the possessing classes. In fact what is important is not the individual existence of one or only a few tycoons who live in luxury, but the mass of wealth which a social minority can use for its pleasures of all kinds while the majority receives only a little more than is absolutely necessary for existence.

Since our subject deals more with the political aspect of the question than the economic, the question we must pose in regard to the regime of capitalist privilege and rule is that of the relationship between the use of brute violence and that of potential force which compels the impoverished to submit to the rules and laws in force without violating them or revolting.

This relationship varies greatly according to the various phases of the history of capitalism and according to the various countries where capitalism has been introduced. We can cite examples of neutral and idyllic zones where the power of the state is exalted as being freely accepted by all the citizens; where there is only a small police force and where even the social conflicts between workers and employers are solved through peaceful means. But these Switzerlands tend, in time and space, to become more and more rare oases in the worldwide capitalist system.

At its birth capitalism could not conquer its ground without open and bloody struggle since the shackles of the state organization of the old regime could only be broken through force. Its expansion in the non-European continents with its colonial expeditions and wars of conquest and pillage was no less bloody, because only through massacre could the mode of social organization of the native population be replaced by that of capitalism, and in some cases this meant the extermination of entire human races, something unknown in pre-bourgeois civilization.

In general, after this virulent phase of the birth and foundation of capitalism, an intermediate period of its development begins. Although this period is marked by constant social clashes, by the repression of revolts of the exploited classes, and by wars between states which however do not embrace all the known world, it is the one which has more than any other given rise to the liberal and democratic apologia that falsely depicts a world in which — except for exceptional and pathological cases — the relationships between individuals and between social strata are supposed to have taken place with a maximum of order, peace, spontaneous consent and free acceptance.

Let us say incidentally that in these colonial or national wars, revolts, insurrections, or repressions — which constitute, even in the smoother and calmer phases of bourgeois history, the areas in which

open violence is unleashed — the bloodshed and the number of victims in these crises tend to increase, all the other conditions being equal, with respect to the crises of the past, and for this we can thank « progressive » bourgeois technological development. In fact, in parallel with the improvement of the means of production, the means of attack and destruction are made more and more potent, more powerful weapons are created, and the casualties which Caesar's praetorians could inflict by putting rebels to the sword were a joke compared to those which machine-gun fire can inflict against the insurgents of the modern epoch.

But our aim is to show that even in long phases of bloodless enforcement of capitalist rule, class force does not cease to be present, and its influence in its potential state against the possible deviations of isolated individuals, organized groups or parties remains the primary factor in conserving the privileges and institutions of the ruling class. We have already cited among the manifestations of this class force not only the entire state apparatus, with its armed forces and its police, even when its weapons are kept at rest, but also the whole arsenal of ideological indoctrination which justifies bourgeois exploitation and is carried out by means of the schools, the press, the church and all the other ways by which the opinions of the masses are moulded. This epoch of apparent tranquillity is only disturbed occasionally by unarmed demonstrations of the proletarian class organizations; and the bourgeois on-lookers can say, after the Mayday march, as in the verses of the poet: « Once more, thanks to Christ and to the police chief, we have had no trouble ».

When social unrest rumbles more threateningly, the bourgeois state begins to show its power by taking measures to maintain order. A technical police expression gives a good idea of the use of potential violence: « the police and the troops are standing by ». This means that there is no street fighting yet, but that if the bourgeois order and the bosses' « rights » were threatened the armed forces would leave their quarters and open fire.

The revolutionary critique has never let itself be hypnotized by the appearances of civility and serene equilibrium of the bourgeois order. It long ago established that even in the most democratic republic the political state constitutes the executive committee of the ruling class; and thus it decisively demolished the stupid theories which would have us believe that after the destruction of the old feudal, clerical and autocratic state a new form of state arises in which, thanks to elective democracy, all the elements of society, whatever their economic condition may be, are represented and protected with equal rights. The political state, even and primarily that representative and parliamentary one, constitutes an apparatus of oppression. It can be compared to an energy reservoir which stores the forces of domination of the economically privileged class. This reservoir is such that these forces are kept in the potential state in situations where social revolt does not near the point of exploding, but it unleashes them in the form of police

repression and bloody violence as soon as revolutionary tremors rise from the social depths.

This is the sense of the classical analysis of Marx and Engels on the relationship between society and state, or in other words between social classes and the state. All attempts to shake this fundamental point of the proletariat's class doctrine have been crushed in the restoration of the revolutionary principles carried out by Lenin, Trotsky and the Communist International immediately after World War I.

There is no scientific sense in establishing the existence of a quantum of potential energy if it is not possible to foresee that, in subsequent situations, it will be liberated in the kinetic state. Likewise the Marxist definition of the character of the bourgeois political state would remain meaningless and inconsistent if it did not conform to the certainty that in the culminating phase this organ of power of capitalism will inevitably unleash all its resources in the kinetic state against the eruption of the proletarian revolution.

Moreover, the equivalent of the Marxist thesis on the increase of poverty, and on the accumulation and concentration of capital could, in the sphere of politics, be nothing other than the concentration and increase of the energy contained within the state apparatus. In fact once the deceitfully peaceful phase of capitalist era had been closed with the outburst of the war of 1914 and with the economic characteristics evolving towards monopoly and towards the active intervention of the state in the economy and in the social struggles, it became evident — above all in the classical analysis of Lenin — that the political state of bourgeois regimes was taking on more and more decided forms of strict domination and police oppression. We have established in other works that the third and most modern phase of capitalism is economically defined as monopolist, introducing economic planning, and politically defined as totalitarian and fascist.

When the first fascist regimes appeared they were considered in the more immediate and commonplace interpretations as a restriction and an abolition of the so-called parliamentary and legal « guaranteed » rights. In actuality it was simply a question, in certain countries, of a passage of the political energy of domination of the capitalist class from the potential state to the kinetic state.

It was clear to every follower of the Marxist perspective — a perspective defined as catastrophic by the stupid castrators of that doctrine's revolutionary strength — that the increasing severity of the class antagonisms would move the conflicts of economic interests to the level of an erupting revolutionary attack launched by the proletarian organizations against the citadel of capitalist state, and that the latter would uncover its artillery and engage in the supreme struggle for its survival.

In certain countries and in certain situations, for example in Italy in 1922 and in Germany in 1933, the tensions of the social relations, the instability of capitalist economic fabric and the crisis of the state

apparatus itself due to the war became so acute that the ruling class could see that the inevitable moment was at hand where, with all the lies of democratic propaganda being exhausted, the only solution was the violent clash between the antagonistic social classes.

Then there occurred what was correctly defined as a capitalists' offensive. Until then the bourgeois class, with its economic exploitation in vigorous development, had seemed to have been slumbering behind the apparent kindness and tolerance of its representative and parliamentary institutions. Having succeeded in mastering a very significant degree of historical strategy, it broke the hesitations and took the initiative, thinking that rather than a supreme defense of the state's fortress against the assault of revolution (which, according to Marx's and Lenin's teaching, does not aim at taking over the state but at totally smashing it) it was preferable to launch an offensive action aiming at the destruction of the bases of the proletarian organization.

Thus a situation which was clearly foreseen in the revolutionary perspective was accelerated to a certain extent. In effect, Marxist communists have never thought that it was possible to carry out their program without this supreme clash between the opposing class forces; and moreover, the analysis of the most recent evolution of capitalism and of the monstrous enlargement of its state machineries with their enormous framework clearly indicated that such a development was inevitable.

The great error of judgement, tactics, and strategy which favored the victory of the counter-revolution was that of deploring capitalism's powerful shift from the democratic hypocrisy to open violence, as if it was a movement that could be historically reversed. Instead of counterposing to this movement the necessity of the destruction of capitalist power, one counterposed instead the stupid pacifist pretension that capitalism would go in reverse, backwards along its path, in a direction opposite to the one which we Marxists have always ascribed to it, and that for the personal convenience of some cowardly rogue politicians, capitalism would be kind enough not to unsheathe its class weapons and return to the inconsistent and obsolete position of mobilization without war which constituted the « pleasant » aspect of the previous period.

The basic mistake is to have been astonished, to have whined or to have deplored that the bourgeoisie carried out its totalitarian dictatorship without mask, whereas we knew very well that this dictatorship had always existed, that the state apparatus had always had, potentially if not in actuality, the specific function of wielding, preserving and defending the power and privilege of the bourgeois minority against revolution. The error consisted in preferring a bourgeois democratic atmosphere to a fascist one; in shifting the battle front from the perspective of the proletarian conquest of power to that of an illusory restoration of a democratic method of capitalist government in the place of the fascist one.

The fatal mistake was of not understanding that in any case the eve of the revolution which had been awaited for so many decades would reveal a bourgeois state drawn up for the armed defense against the proletarian advance, and that therefore such a situation must appear as a progress, and not as a regression, in comparison with the years of apparent social peace and of limited impetus from the class force of the proletariat. The damage done to the development of the revolutionary energies and to the prospects of the realization of a socialist society does not stem from the fact that the bourgeoisie organized in a fascist form is supposedly more powerful and more efficient in defending its privilege than a bourgeoisie still organized in a democratic form. Its class power and energy is the same in both cases. In the democratic phase it is in its potential state: over the muzzle of the cannon there is the innocuous protection of a covering. In the fascist phase energy is manifested in the kinetic state: the hood is taken off and the shot is fired. The defeatist and idiotic request which the traitorous leaders of the proletariat make to exploitative and oppressive capitalism is that it put back the deceitful covering over the muzzle of the weapon. If this were done the efficiency of the domination and exploitation would not have diminished but only increased thanks to the revitalized expedient of legalistic deception.

Since it would be even more insane to ask the enemy to disarm, we must gladly welcome the fact that, compelled by the urgencies of the situation, it unveils its own weapons, for then these weapons will be less difficult to face and to defeat.

Therefore the bourgeois regime of open dictatorship is an inevitable and predicted phase of the historical life of capitalism and it will not die without having gone through this phase. To fight to postpone this unmasking of the energies of the antagonistic social classes, to carry on a vain and rhetorical propaganda inspired by a stupid horror of dictatorship in principle, all this work can only favor the survival of capitalist regime and the prolonged subjection and oppression of the working class.

And with just as much certainty we can conclude the following, though it is quite likely to cause an uproar from all the geese of the bourgeois left: the comparison between the democratic phase of capitalism and the totalitarian phase shows that the amount of class oppression is greater in the first (although it is obvious that the ruling class always tends to choose the method which is more useful for its conservation). Fascism undoubtedly unleashes a greater mass of police and repressive violence, including bloody repression. But this aspect of kinetic energy primarily and gravely affects the very few authentic leaders and revolutionary militants of the working class movement, together with a stratum of middle bourgeois professional politicians who pretend to be progressive and friends of the working class, but who are nothing but the militia specially trained by the

capitalists for use in the periods of the parliamentary comedy. Those who do not change their style and their costume in time are ousted with a kick in the ass — which is the main reason for their outcries.

As for the mass of the working class, it continues to be exploited as it has always been in the economic field. And the vanguard elements which form within the class for the assault against the present regime continue as always to receive — as soon as they take the correct anti-legalistic way of action — the lead which is reserved for them even by the bourgeois democratic governments. This we can see in countless examples, on the part of the republicans in France in 1848 and 1871, on the part of Social Democrats in Germany in 1919, etc.

But the new method introducing planning in the management of capitalist economy — which in relation to the antiquated unlimited classical liberalism of the past constitutes a form of *self-limitation* of capitalism — leads to a levelling of the extortion of surplus value around an average. The reformist measures which the right-wing socialists had advocated for many decades are adopted. In such a way the sharpest and extreme edges of capitalist exploitation are eased, while forms of public assistance develop.

All this aims at delaying the crises of class conflicts and the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. But undoubtedly it would be impossible to reach this aim without having succeeded in reconciling, to a certain degree, the open repression against the revolutionary vanguard with a relief of the most pressing economic needs of the great masses. These two aspects of the historical drama in which we live are a condition for one another. Churchill in his latter days said with good reason to the *Labourites*: you won't be able to found a state-run economy without a police state. More interventions, more regulations, more controls, more police. Fascism consists of the integration of artful social reformism with the open armed defense of state power.

Not all the examples of fascism are at the same level. Nevertheless the German one, as pitiless in the elimination of its enemies as one may say, has achieved a very high average standard of living economically speaking and an administration that technically was excellent, and when it has imposed war restrictions these even fell on the propertied classes and this to an unprecedented extent.

Therefore, even though bourgeois class oppression, in the totalitarian phase, increases the proportion of the kinetic use of violence with respect to the potential one, the total pressure on the proletariat does not increase but diminishes. It is precisely for this reason that the final crisis of the class struggle historically undergoes a delay.

The death of revolutionary energies lies in class collaboration. Democracy is class collaboration through lots of talk, fascism is plain class collaboration in fact. We are living in the midst of this latter historical phase. The rekindling of the class struggle will dialectically arise from a later phase, but for the time being let us establish that

it cannot proceed through rallying the working classes behind the slogan of the return to liberalism, in which they have nothing to gain, not even relatively.

This section deals mainly with the use of force, violence and dictatorship by the ruling classes. It does not exhaust the subject of the use of these energies by the proletariat in the struggle for the conquest of power and in the exercise of power, an important question that will be reserved for following sections. But still remaining within the field of the study of the bourgeois forms of dictatorship, it would do well to specify that when we speak about the fascist, totalitarian and dictatorial capitalist method we always refer to collective organizations and actions. We do not see the prevailing factor of the historical scene to be individual dictators, who so greatly occupy the attention of a public that has been artfully enthralled, whether it is by their supporters or their adversaries.

During the last world war, two of the Big Three have been eliminated: Roosevelt and Churchill. But nothing has substantially changed in the course of events. We will leave Italy aside because here the examples of fascism and anti-fascism have had a very clownish character (the first models of an innovation always make one laugh, as the early automobiles which can be seen in a museum compared with a modern mass produced one). In Germany the person of Hitler represented a superfluous factor of the powerful Nazi organization of forces. The Soviet regime will do very well without Stalin when his time has come. The other impressive machinery of domination, that of Japan, was based upon castes and classes without a personal leader.

We can escape from the overwhelming tide of lies which gorges modern public opinion only if we relentlessly drive away both the fetish of the individual as a protagonist of history, meaning not only the ordinary person, the man in the street, but also the one in the center of the stage, the Leader, the Great Man.

That we live in an epoch of self-government of the peoples, not even the simpletons believe...

But we are not in the hands of a few great men either. We are in the hands of a very few great class Monsters, of the greatest states of the world, machines of domination whose enormous power weighs upon everybody and everything. Their open accumulation of potential energies foreshadows, in all corners of the earth, the kinetic use of immense and crushing forces when the conservation of the present institutions will require it. And these forces will be unleashed without the slightest hesitation on any side in the face of civil, moral and legal scruples, those ideal principles which are croaked about from morning till night by the infamous, purchased, hypocritical propagandas.

(To be continued.)

Angola : From the Victory of the Independence Movement to Bourgeois Normalization

Long Live the Angolan Victory and the Emancipation Struggles in Black Africa!

(From *Le Prolétaire* no. 214, February 21, 1976)

The victory of the young People's Republic of Angola and the rout of the hostile troops on all fronts is an event of great significance.

This country of six million inhabitants contains a fabulous wealth — it overflows with oil and agricultural treasures and abounds in minerals and diamonds. This fact, along with the additional pressures of a protracted armed struggle, compelled the new Portuguese regime to retreat from Mozambique and Guinea, so that it could concentrate all its forces on Angola, and all this behind a mask of deceitful socialist pretensions. It is in Angola where the source of Portugal's financial power lay — a financial power springing both from its direct participation in plunder and from its position as middleman and policeman in the interests of Euro-American, as well as South African, imperialism.

By provoking panic among the colonists and thus a massive exodus, the Angolan independence movement has magnificently ridiculed Lisbon and its backers. But it then had to face a double attack.

In the North there was the FNLA, operating thanks to Washington, the generosity of Paris, and the calculating hospitality of Kenshasu ; it was militarily supplied through the good graces of Peking (which lost a little of its anti-imperialist prestige in the affair), reinforced by Euro-American mercenaries, and backed up by Mobutu's army and air force. In the South there was the attack of UNITA to which the Portuguese state had generously entrusted its black troops. This movement was fully supported by Pretoria, organized by its expeditionary corps in order to control Cassengua and Benguela, and continually propped up by the U.S., France and Germany, all of which in December 1975 began to stake their bets completely on it, much to the detriment of Roberto Holden's FNLA.

The MPLA, however, greatly aided by a strong Cuban contingent and by an imposing amount of Russian aid and advisors, not only routed the feeble FNLA and drove back Mobutu's troops and the mercenaries to Zaire, but it also drove off the column of South African intervention and literally wiped out Savimbi's UNITA troops.

The Western bourgeoisies were startled by these events, and for good reasons. Of course the fact that Russian imperialism has been able to set foot in this area is no small factor in their uneasiness. Moscow has achieved a very important victory in its strategical plan since from now on it can monitor the wealth leaving Zaire in the North and control that leaving by rail from Benguela, thus gaining a foothold on the route of the oil and minerals going from the Indian Ocean towards Europe and even the US — a route that it already watches from Aden, Somali and India. But it cannot be said that US imperialism cannot find some consolation in this disaster — hasn't Moscow dangled before Washington's eyes the possibility of economic aid for the reconstruction of a country devastated by sabotage and war?

Europe undoubtedly lost a great deal in this event, at least for the time being. After Portugal, its trump card in the region remained South Africa. But Vorsters' aid to Lisbon against the Mozambique rebellion proved to be incapable of preventing the collapse of the decrepit Portuguese Empire. South Africa also experienced a bitter military defeat in Angola, which it had considered to be within its sphere of influence.

The importance of the victory of the MPLA over South Africa, that policeman of southern Africa, whose guns are pointed towards all the emancipation movements in the region, goes far beyond the scope of a strictly military victory. It is already a tremendous encouragement to the struggles of the exploited and the oppressed of the cities and the countryside in this whole section of Africa, an area which is the most industrialized and at the same time the most explosive. But it has a still wider importance than this, a true historical importance. It is a victory of the emancipation movement of the black race against the age-old oppression perpetuated by the white race. The military success thus becomes an inspiring victory in terms of morale which blows a liberating wind over all of oppressed Africa, a wind which sooner or later will strike Russian imperialism itself in spite of its military contribution to the Angolan victory (incidentally we can be sure that Russia will use all its weight to minimize the political consequences of this victory).

If this victory worries the bourgeoisies of the large imperialist countries, it can only encourage their working class since the power of the states which oppress them comes from the double exploitation of the domestic working class and of the laboring masses of the oppressed countries.

But there is another thing in which the international proletariat has reasons to rejoice : these are the first steps made on the political

scene by the young proletariat of Luanda and the other towns, by the proletarians and semi-proletarians of the plantations, and by all the exploited masses they draw in their wake, above all the poor peasants. And these steps in fact are quite full of promise.

The revolutionary masses of Luanda, in response to the intimidation and the repression of the Portuguese army aided by the FNLA and UNITA, armed themselves in spite of the leadership of the MPLA (in April the MPLA still affirmed that the « people did not need to arm themselves since the army sprang from the people and was in its service »). They brought down the provisional government and provoked the Portuguese exodus and the crumbling of the colonial administration. They forced the rupture of the alliance between the MPLA and Armed Forces Movement, and the destruction of the front between these two and the other local and imperialist interests. In doing this, the revolutionary masses compelled the MPLA to fight an open struggle against and to defeat the FNLA, UNITA and their masters, even if Russia was able to prevent their total annihilation. It is easily understandable why Savimbi posed, in December 1975, the « demilitarization » of Luanda as a condition for the reconstitution of a governmental coalition.

We have shown many times that the revival of the working class struggle in Portugal and the desertions in the army were given impetus by the revolutionary movement in the colonies, but unfortunately the still enormous weight of the opportunism and chauvinism manifesting itself even in the fringes of the « far left » did not allow this struggle to reach the point of an open attack against the common oppressor. And in Europe, without speaking of the U.S., the opium of social-imperialism is still a terrible obstacle in the way of the class struggle. It prevents the linking up of the proletariat in the large imperialist countries with the exploited masses in the oppressed countries, which continue to support the weight of the struggle against imperialism all alone.

The weight of the last fact results in a situation where, in the oppressed countries, in spite of significant upheavals, the most radical parties have the greatest difficulty in surviving or even being born, and especially those which represent the interests of the working class. These circumstances favor parties which are the most ready for compromise, and within these parties, the most moderate elements. This fact has been proven in Luanda, where the MPLA has been obliged to accept the arming of the proletarian districts but where the opportune arrival of the Cuban troops allowed it to give a solid organization and discipline to its army and to relegate the people's militia to an insignificant role, subordinating it to the armed forces ; but at the same time it drove back to the borders those movements hated by the popular masses and repelled as well the mercenaries and enemy expeditionary corps. The MPLA has thus succeeded in satisfying the irrepressible needs of the revolutionary masses, but it has done so *in its way* — not the « plebeian » way. Through the prestige it received

in this role, it has found the power to isolate and fight the most radical elements.

The MPLA has begun, thanks to the wise advice from the great Russian brother (which once more shows its counter-revolutionary nature), to « stabilize » the army by discharging the most restless elements and executing some extremist soldiers. It also instigated purges of the militias and decapitated the « leftist » organizations by prohibiting their newspapers and repressing them; in addition, it sharpened the struggle against the left wing of the MPLA, especially among the youth.

The counterpart of this policy is (no wonder) a certain « lack of enthusiasm » for going to the front, as well as in the factories and at the docks — thus the necessity to launch daily calls for « work », « discipline », etc.

It is not astonishing that, in experiencing their first political battles, the forerunners of the bourgeoisie realized, as did their elder brothers in other continents, that it is necessary to repress the impulses of the exploited masses, and above all of the young proletarian nuclei, out of the fear that in their impetuous burst the latter would leap at their throat to defend their separate class interests. It is this therefore, which necessitates the autonomous class party even before the national and democratic tasks have been achieved, even when the bourgeoisie and the other classes still have a progressive, or even revolutionary, character. It is this class party which is necessary in order to assert the separate proletarian interests in a struggle which will then be able to be that much stronger and in which the leadership, if conditions permit, will be able to fall into the hands of the proletariat — a struggle which, in any case, could serve as a springboard in preparing for the Communist Revolution.

The Angolan victory is a great step for all of Africa. It has avenged Lumumba and the Congolese disaster, and has avenged the heroic defeat of the Union of Peoples of Cameroon by French imperialism. A new era is opened for « backward » Africa, which has just given a lesson to « civilized » Europe and America. We must welcome the African struggle with the greatest enthusiasm !

And the African proletariat has just taken a still greater step, the step of a giant, pushing today with all its forces for a more radical independence movement, burning all bridges with the past. What will it not do tomorrow when it fights in its own name and under its own flag? May the proletarians of the imperialist countries take up its example, and hear its call to struggle, so that they do not again leave it all alone! May they find, in this example and in this call, the strength to struggle for their independent class interests and finally to take up again their tradition and their program, the single program of the proletariat of the entire world, that of communism!

Bourgeois Normalization in Angola

(From *Le Prolétaire* no. 239, March 12, 1977)

« Only the proletariat can lead the bourgeois revolution to its end ». This statement of classical Marxism which some find so difficult to digest sums up the historical balance sheet of the forces which operate on the field of the national-democratic revolution and indicates the role which the proletariat must play in it.

This statement does not at all mean, as some pretend, that any revolution, even a bourgeois one, is impossible from this point on unless it is led by the proletariat. Instead it states the fact that — to recall the « phases » of the bourgeois revolution stated in Marx's *Address to the Central Committee of the Communist League* in 1850 — the radical bourgeoisie, then the radical petty-bourgeoisie inevitably stop mid-road before having achieved, in a consistent way, all the tasks of their revolution. The fear of being overrun by the social forces (in the first place the proletariat) which they were compelled to put into motion in order to defeat the old regime or in order to reach a favorable compromise with the latter force them to limit the scope of the revolution on the home front, on the national level, and also on the international level. It is from this fact that arises the importance of the proletariat to take up the baton from these classes in order to complete the democratic tasks. The proletariat both promotes the demands of the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses of the cities and countryside — demands which are directed at the elimination of every kind of oppression and exploitation — and also accelerates the spread of the revolutionary flame in the whole historical area of the revolution with the aim of destroying the *status quo* there, whose persistence means an unbearable weight both for the proletariat and for the impoverished masses which follow it.

The anti-colonial revolution in Angola is a further proof of this historical law which confirms that the parties of the bourgeois revolution do their utmost to stamp out the flame sparked by the national revolutionary struggle in order to prevent it from spreading to the whole area (in this particular case that of southern Africa) where it historically must blaze up.

We will not lengthily dwell on this point. It is sufficient to recall that the MPLA (just as its counterpart in Mozambique, FRELIMO) showed once it seized power, that it aimed at « stabilizing » the situation in the region in upheaval from the chain of explosions set off precisely by the black victory over Portuguese colonialism. Thus while Samora Machel sought an agreement with the warden of this area, South Africa, Agostinho Neto on his part reached a compromise with the imperialist puppet state of Zaire. Through this agreement the puppet Mobutu stopped all *official* aid to the FNLA and recognized that the only movement « representing the Angolan people » was the MPLA. In exchange the latter undertook to prevent the opponents of this Katangan

butcher who were taking refuge in Northeast Angola from infiltrating into Zaire in order to lead the armed struggle against imperialism and its puppet regime.

It is the tremendous upsurge of the Angolan masses which forced the MPLA to abandon the path of a « negotiated solution » with Portugal, whose thoroughly colonialist character had been masked, after April 25 (1974), with the criminal complicity of the so-called « revolutionaries of the far left ». It is this upsurge which next forced the MPLA to break with the FNLA and UNITA, those agents of world imperialism. In the crucial months following independence, the magnificent determination of these masses permitted the young Angolan state to break the encirclement of Luanda and Cabinda, and thus to avoid a military defeat, the consequences of which would have been catastrophic in the first place for the masses themselves.

But beyond the hatred inspired in them by the white colonizers and the urgent need to liberate themselves from their yoke, the Angolan masses also were fighting for a radical change in their miserable living conditions and advanced demands which went far beyond the timid petty bourgeois program of the MPLA. Thus certain of its slogans such as « general popular resistance », « produce to resist », « people's power », etc. carried a *popular* content which Agostinho Neto's party had neither predicted or wished. Going beyond the MPLA's program, the masses constituted self-defense committees which took upon the organization of all activity, from the organization of production and distribution to the organization of the armed struggle.

To win and maintain the support of the masses the MPLA was obliged to take up, at least in words, the demands advanced by the armed shanty-towns. Therefore, once the critical moment of the military encirclement was over, it found itself in a delicate situation when the masses, taking the promises of their leaders seriously, wanted to pass from words into action.

Le Monde, with that mixture of cynicism and paternalism which characterizes all « imperialist liberals », described the situation in this way:

« Today we are paying for the demagoguery which we let ourselves slip into in our *propaganda war* [*sic!*] against UNITA and the FNLA » the Angolan leaders told us. The population, above all in the urban centers, dreamed of a mythical independence where, without any effort, money would flow in torrents [read: an independence which would bring it a significant amelioration of its living conditions, something evidently « unimaginable » for the pen prostitutes in the service of imperialism]. The working class movement [...] lacks experience [meaning: these people are so backwards that they are not even capable of producing, as in our country, opportunist leaders well trained in peaceful collaboration between classes] and the imprudent promises of the MPLA in regard to the « elimination of capitalist bosses » have often been taken to mean ready money. All

authority, private or governmental, still brings to mind a « boss » in the eyes of the workers, which reminds them of colonial oppression ». The same newspaper reports the acknowledgement by a leader of the MPLA, of the *irresolvable programmatic opposition* between the proletarians and semi-proletarians on one side, and the petty-bourgeois on the other. They quote, « The idea of independence, such as *the majority of Angolans* conceive of it, is opposed to our conception of the socialist way » (*Le Monde*, Sept. 3, 1976). And for good reason!

The new Angolan ruling class had to immediately set out to reduce the discrepancy between the *program promised* by the MPLA and that *which it actually had the intention of putting into effect*. In other words it had to bring back the demands of the impoverished masses of the shanty-towns within the moderate bounds of the petty-bourgeois program. The Cuban troops sent by Castro played an important and decisive role in bringing them to heel (1).

Lacking a solidly organized machinery for controlling the population, the MPLA sought to take control of the economic, administrative and military organization which the masses had tended to assume themselves. It is the troops that arrived *en force* from Havana in the name of « proletarian internationalism » who have set up this machinery for control, thus enabling the MPLA to isolate the radical elements (including those within its own ranks) and to confront the push of the masses towards a more radical outcome of the revolution:

« In the most difficult moments of the « second war of liberation » anyone who was able to present themselves at the recruitment centers received a hasty training, sometimes lasting less than eight days, and left for the front. The 40,000 new « soldiers » *recruited above all from the mass of urban unemployed* [the quotation marks are the journalist's, for whom of course the only soldiers without quotation marks are those who received a good chauvinist training for at least a year under the iron fist of a military hierarchy steeped in a long tradition of colonial and imperialist wars] observed a semblance of discipline as long as the war was at its height. The authorities are attempting to separate *those who are really part of the armed forces* [read: those who bow to the MPLA program] from *those who have donned a uniform and secured a weapon for often dubious reasons* [read: for the defense of their class interests which go well above those of the small and middle urban bourgeoisie which is the social base of the MPLA]. The military command has set out, WITH THE DECISIVE ASSISTANCE OF THE CUBANS, to organize, discipline and control an army capable of wiping out the guerilla and protecting the borders » (*Le Monde*, Sept. 2, 1976). Let us add that the liberal hypocrisy of our pen prostitute « omits » *and to repress the movements to come of the proletarians and poor peasants*. The same thing has occurred in the area of production: « In the enterprises where they [the Cubans] apparently more and more often assume the functions of technicians, their diligence and their discipline stand out clearly against the non-chalance in which the workers have sometimes settled into » (*Le Monde*,

Sept. 4, 1976). In short the Cubans troops play the role of foremen and — the supreme proof of proletarian solidarity — put these « lazy blacks » to work!

The support of these « internationalists » enables the MPLA to contain the poor masses where they are the most dangerous, that is to say in the army and the factories. The MPLA has been able to directly take in hand the administration of the state, and to entrust it quite naturally to the black, mulatto, and even white petty-bourgeois, of which it is the political expression.

« Only the petty-bourgeoisie knows all the ins and outs of administration », explained a high official of the MPLA. « It is indispensable to us even if [after acknowledging the class nature of the revolution, a little demagoguery in order to deceive the proletarians is required] we must strictly control it. » (*Le Monde*, Sept. 4, 1976). The grass-roots committees have been taken in hand by the government which controls their membership against the will of the proletarians and semi-proletarians.

Parallel with this, the government enacted a series of exceptional laws (July 1976): all wage negotiations were suspended; the National Union of Angolan Workers declared all strikes illegal which did not have its consent or spread beyond its control; those committing « economic sabotage » (2) are liable for forced labor. In short, the government has placed the poor masses which were the motive force of the revolution under a true iron heel!

The Angolan revolution, an integral part of the revolution in southern Africa, is still very far from having fulfilled the bourgeois democratic tasks. On one hand, the demands of the great masses have not been satisfied, notably in the countryside where the MPLA has done nothing substantial to launch the basis of an agrarian revolution able to answer the pressing needs of the rural masses. On the other hand, the constitution of a true national state is far from being established, be this only because this supposes precisely that which the MPLA has refused from the beginning — the upset of the *status quo* in Southern Africa, the shattering of *all the black states* of this area, those artificial states created and propped up by imperialism, and the struggle of the black masses against the white states of South Africa and Rhodesia, those policemen in the pay of world imperialism.

(1) Castro's Cuban mercenaries « bring a certain stability to Angola » — Andrew Young, US Ambassador to the United Nations, quoted in *Time*, April 25, 1977.

(2) The law considers as economic sabotage all « acts detrimental to the steady evolution of the revolutionary process in the field of the national economy » (*Le Monde*, Sept. 3, 1976). These guilty are subject to imprisonment from 2 to 8 years. Several days before the adoption of the law, the Minister of Labor had classified as « counter-revolutionaries » the workers striking at a coffee packaging factory (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 7, 1976).

A True Solidarity with Lebanon and South Africa

The exploited masses of Lebanon and Palestine have today come under the blows of a united attack by the most compact of counter-revolutionary alliances gathered around the chief policeman, the U.S., and flanked by France, the protector of Christian right. They must face the colonist state of Israel and have seen each of their « brother » states transform themselves in turn into policemen and butchers. They can count neither on the so-called « socialist » states, which one by one have given their blessing to all these policemen, nor on the democratic leaders who can only propose so-called « agreements » which turn out to be nothing more than breathing spaces for the enemy and traps for the fedayeen and the oppressed masses.

These are the same forces which today have set themselves up in southern Africa — an area shaken by the tremendous black revolt against a South African regime armed to the teeth, and especially so by France. Can we expect anything else from these forces than what they did in the Middle East?

No. Only one force is capable of giving a true aid to the anti-imperialist struggles. It is that force which needs to weaken imperialism, an imperialism which solidly unites all the enemies of these struggles: this force is the *proletariat of the large capitalist countries* whose dramatic absence from direct struggle against imperialism has left the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed countries in decades of isolation, of which the Lebanese tragedy is the most recent consequence.

The perspective of Marx and Lenin was of soldering one to the other, the proletarian struggles in the imperialist countries and the struggle of the workers and poor peasants in the colonies and semi-colonies. *This alliance must break imperialism at its core*, opening the way to communism in the economically advanced countries, and in the backwards countries enabling *the democratic revolution to be carried up to its end and insuring its transformation into a proletarian revolution.*

Lenin's International was defeated by the counter-revolution. However in its defeat, the perspective that it defended has been confirmed. Not only has Stalinism chained the proletariat in the large imperialist countries to the chariot of the national economy and the state, and driven it into the bloody disputes between rapacious imperialists in World War II, thus driving off for decades all hope for the renewal of the proletarian struggle; not only has it broken the link between the two movements, but when it participated in the governments (as in France in 1945-47) it has made itself the direct accomplice of the repression of the struggles in the colonies, and throughout the world it helped to subordinate the militant movement of the workers and poor peasants to the bourgeois democratic movement and sometimes even to still more moderate movements! The latter want to limit the struggle to the demand for political independence and are so much the more ready to compromise with imperialism and the old classes and castes when the danger of a militant movement of the exploited masses against all forms of exploitation becomes more menacing.

In this way Stalinism has replaced the necessary solidarity with the revolutionary struggles in the «Third World» with appeals to governments in the name of the empty principles of justice, liberty in general and equality between nations, and with «humanitarian campaigns» which cause no harm to imperialism and are designed to hide behind «noble attitudes» *their actual capitulation before the established order*. Such a «solidarity» can be received only as an insult by the proletarians and semi-proletarians who have taken up arms against imperialism.

The struggle of the oppressed masses of the Middle East and South Africa is linked to our struggle because it strikes a common enemy — the great imperialist states which feed off of the double exploitation of the «domestic» proletarians and of the impoverished masses of the oppressed countries. This is why all the defeats of the anti-imperialist movement in Beirut, Johannesburg or elsewhere are our defeats. They mean heavier irons around our wrists. On the other hand, a victory there would open a break in the prison wall of our exploitation and would give a tremendous aid to our struggle in the heart of imperialism.

Certainly, the immediate objectives of the revolutionary movements in the Middle East and South Africa are not socialist. But their realization would allow the bridles of social backwardness, reinforced by the imperialist states, to be broken, and would open the way to the development of the modern class struggle in these areas. It would thus bring the hour of socialism *nearer* for the «Third World» as for all humanity.

This is why the needs of the struggle of the exploited masses of the oppressed countries just as those of the proletarian struggle throughout the world require that *the most radical political methods be used* in the Middle East as in South Africa. This necessity will collide with the politics of the democratic leaders of these movements,

whom the Stalinist counter-revolution often allowed to assume leadership in the anti-imperialist struggles.

The proletarian movement in the imperialist countries and the movement for social emancipation in the oppressed countries are linked by a common fate: *together they must win or together they will be defeated*.

The true aid needed by the exploited masses of Lebanon, Palestine, Southern Africa and all the oppressed countries is *for the proletariat of the imperialist countries to take the road of the class struggle again*. What is needed is the expression of its solidarity not on the sterile terrain of inoffensive pleas but on that of the direct struggle against the common enemy.

It is through this struggle — a struggle which must be linked to the fight to eradicate the poison of reformism and social-imperialism — that it will be possible to *unlock the jaws of imperialist oppression*. It is only through this struggle that the *indispensable alliance* of the proletarians and poor peasants of the entire world can be forged. This alliance could particularly be expressed by taking up again the tradition of the boycott of arms shipments on the part of the immediate organizations of the proletariat, and by a material aid through reliable channels so that it really reaches its destination.

This alliance can only be forged by the *World Communist Party*, the rebirth and the reinforcement of which are an urgent need of the proletarian struggle and, as well, of the anti-imperialist struggle which it will be able to integrate into a *single international strategy* and in a *centralized world tactic*.

Certainly, this way is long and difficult. But no short and easy way exists. *This is the only realistic way*.

Long live the proletarians and poor peasants of Palestine and Lebanon!

Long live the black proletarians and semi-proletarians struggling against capitalist domination in South Africa and Rhodesia!

Long live the World Communist Revolution!

communist program

No. 1 - October 1975

- Once Again on Crisis and Revolution
- The Course of World Imperialism
- Force, Violence and Dictatorship in the Class Struggle
- The Bitter Fruits of Thirty Years of Democratic Peace and Capitalist Prosperity
- The Cycle of the «Awakening of Asia» is Closed Only to Reopen Again on a Higher Level

No. 2 - March 1976

Party and Class

- Introduction
- Theses on the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution Adopted by the Second Congress of the Communist International (1920)
- Party and Class (1921)
- Party and Class Action (1921)
- Proletarian Dictatorship and Class Party (1951)

Price per copy: 6 F - 50 p. - \$ 1.00

The Exploits of University Marxism

(Concerning the Works of Messrs. Baran and Sweezy) (1)

How can Marxist theory be refuted, reformed, deformed, or castrated? This is a problem which has excited University academicians for almost a century. Two of these have succeeded in making of Marxism a theory of economic growth, and of socialism a recipe for economic development. They have presented Marx's method as the study of empirical models of reality, denied the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (after first having confused it with the rate of surplus value), and defined unemployment as the underemployment of men and equipment resulting from defective organisation and insufficient demand. Despite these and many more achievements they are considered by «enlightened opinion» as «great Marxist economists». For an epoch which likes to keep the record straight it would be unjust not to devote a few pages to these astonishing champions of the destruction and falsification, in the name of Marxism, of Marxist theory — Messrs. Baran and Sweezy.

For want of space and patience to take up in detail all the enormities which are served up in the course of two works, (Baran: *The Political Economy of Growth*; Baran and Sweezy: *Monopoly Capital*), we shall be content to deal with three topics: the idea of «economic surplus», Marx's scientific method, and monopoly capitalism (2).

I Economic Surplus

The idea of «economic surplus» is expounded in Baran's book *The Political Economy of Growth*. It is the culmination of a complete falsification of Marxist theory which presents Marx's work as a theory of economic growth and reduces socialism to a method of economic development.

(1) This article was originally published in 1969, in no. 47 of our theoretical review in French *Programme Communiste*.

(2) Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, Monthly Review Press, 1957; Baran & Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital*, Monthly Review Press, 1966. For a critique of Baran's theories (and those of the *Monthly Review*) on the question of «underdevelopment», we refer the reader to the article «Marxisme et sous-développement» published in *Programme Communiste* no. 53-54, October 1971.

To make believe that black is white it is necessary also to make believe that white is black. To effect the total *reversal* which consists in making Marx's work into a study of growth, and at the same time to find it in conflict with bourgeois economics Baran begins by reversing the latter completely and presenting it as opposed to economic growth.

« In its beginnings, economics was a revolutionary intellectual effort to seek out and establish the working principles of an economic system best able to advance the cause of mankind. In its later days it has turned upon its own past, becoming a mere attempt at an explanation and justification of the status quo — condemning and suppressing at the same time all endeavors to judge the existing economic order by standards of reason, or to comprehend the origins of the prevailing conditions and the developmental potentialities that they contain... » (p. 4).

« Current efforts to bring about conditions indispensable for economic development in advanced and backward capitalist countries alike come continuously into conflict with the economic and political order of capitalism and imperialism. Thus to ruling opinion in the United States (but also in some other parts of the capitalist world), the world-wide drive for economic progress inevitably appears as profoundly subversive of the existing social order and of the prevailing system of international domination — as a revolutionary movement that has to be bribed, blocked, and, if possible, broken, if the capitalist system is at all to be preserved » (p. 11).

The « world-wide drive for economic progress » is subversive? One is tempted to smile at such statements, but for the moment let us pretend to take them seriously.

It is a fact that bourgeois political economy, at first revolutionary as it strove to break down the barriers to capitalist development, afterwards became that which we know today, that of the status quo, which means that it considers capitalism eternal and concerns itself solely with its justification and smooth operation. But what is this smooth operation of capitalism? It is the exact opposite to the stagnation suggested by Baran. Marx shows in Vol. 1 of *Capital* (3) that the general formula of capital, its most abstract representation, (and thus appropriate to *all* its phases and forms and not merely to *some* of them), in fact its very essence, is the movement M-C-M', i.e. value which begets value. This movement, when applied to industrial capital (the principal form of capital, from which the others, i.e. interest bearing and merchant's capital, are derived) and constantly reproduced in a cyclical manner, results in accumulation or enlarged reproduction. The capitalist is merely the agent of this movement, his economists its apologists.

« Except as personified capital, the capitalist has no historic value, and no right to... historical existence... And so far only is his own transitory existence implied in the transitory necessity for the capitalist mode of production. But so far as he is personified capital, it is not values in use and the enjoyment of them, but exchange-value and its augmentation, that spur him into action. Fanatically bent on making value expand itself, he ruthlessly forces the human race to

(3) Contained in Chapter IV: « The General Formula for Capital ». *Capital*, Vol. 1, Moore-Aveling edition, London, 1938, p. 123 ff.

produce for production's sake; he thus forces the development of the productive powers of society, and creates those historical conditions, which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society, a society in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle » (4).

« Accumulate! Accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets... Save! Save! i.e. reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus-value or surplus-product into capital! Accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production's sake: by this formula classical economy expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie » (5).

Production for production's sake; this then is the reflection in the bourgeois mind of the real movement of industrial capital in its search for surplus value. One can now recognize the *ideology of growth* as being merely the transposition, idealisation and camouflage by vulgar political economy of the iron law which represents the very essence of capitalism. Every representation of economic growth as the most desirable ideal and the ultimate goal of humanity is not and cannot be anything more than the ideology of capitalism, just as the old « Liberty! Equality! » was not and could not have been anything more than the ideology of small commodity production and simple circulation. Produce more! Such is the universal *cri-de-cœur* of capitalism, such is the command in the name of which the working classes of the East as well as the West have been enslaved. The « world-wide drive for economic progress » (a pleasant euphemism which would cause us to laugh did it not serve to spread complete confusion among the proletariat) is so little subversive that it holds power throughout the entire world. It has taken the pretty pseudonym of development, and even of human progress, to hide its true identity: the frenzied accumulation of surplus value extracted from the proletariat.

Baran elaborates this first falsification to serve as a starting point for a second, even more enormous, falsehood. According to this it has fallen to Marx and Engels to take up the standard of economic development, let fall from the hands of an impotent bourgeoisie.

« Thus the concern with economic and social change was left to a « heretical » school of economics and social science. Marx and Engels accepted in essence the insistence of the classical economists on capitalism's giant contribution to economic development. Yet, not wedded to the now dominant capitalist class, and [not]... impelled to regard capitalism as the « natural » form of society and as the ultimate fulfilment of human aspirations, they were able to perceive the limits and barriers to progress inherent in the capitalist system. Indeed their approach to the matter was radically different from that of bourgeois economics. While the latter was (and is) interested in economic development only to the extent that it has led to the establishment, and is conducive to the stabilisation of, the capitalist order, Marx and Engels considered the capitalist order itself as likely to survive only as long as it did not become a fetter on further economic and social progress » (p. 5).

(4) *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chap. 24, p. 603.

(5) *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chap. 24, p. 606.

A clever trick. It is true that according to Marxist theory the final cause of the revolution which destroys a mode of production is the antagonism between the development of the productive forces and the relations of production; capitalism must therefore die (with suitable help from the proletariat) from its own growth. But this does not in any way imply that Marx was an apostle of economic growth, studying the capitalist mode of production from the point of view of the development which it permits or impedes. Nor shall socialism be a mode of production called upon to substitute itself for capitalism in order to allow for even faster accumulation. «Development of the productive forces of social labour», wrote Marx, «is the historic task and justification of capital. This is just the way in which it unconsciously creates the material requirements of a higher mode of production» (6). This superior mode of production will not have the same aim as capitalism. Its task is quite different: to profit from the development already achieved in order to abolish classes, socially manage the forces of production, and reduce the working time to the time necessary to produce only those use-values corresponding to the effective needs, historically determined, of the species. As for Marxism, far from being a theory of growth, its function is to be for the proletariat an intellectual arm which permits it to understand the mode of production which enslaves it. It enables the proletariat to recognize the laws of that mode of production, to thus predict its inevitable downfall and be the agent of that downfall, to finally substitute for it the superior mode of production which shall be its dialectical negation. Baran reduces Marx to the level of vulgar economy and ascribes to socialism a mission which represents the very essence of capitalism. One cannot imagine a confusion more complete. It is this sad note which begins the book of our «great Marxist economist».

After this one can plainly expect anything. To shore up his thesis Baran now proceeds to «demonstrate» that present-day capitalism is sabotaging economic development. His position is, in substance, as follows. In the developed countries a fall in rates of growth has established itself as a result of the appearance of monopoly capitalism. It is because of the monopolies that capitalism does not produce all that it is capable of producing. In effect, monopoly capitalism is irrational and anarchic; it impedes technical innovation by caring more for the returns on its investments. Above all, the monopoly sectors of the economy make considerable profits, and

«... This tends to reduce the value of aggregate investment since the relatively few monopolistic and oligopolistic firms to which the bulk of the profits accrue find it both unprofitable to plow them back into their own enterprises and increasingly difficult to invest them elsewhere in the economy» (p. 85).

The result of all this is that net investment is less than it could be and that under monopoly capitalism there is a lack of development of necessary production and a squandering of the net product.

The reader will have recognised in passing many of the ideas of the national-communists on the villainous monopolies who waste their profits instead of investing them. All of these self-styled Marxists must be reminded

(6) *Capital*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1966, Chap. 15, p. 259.

1) that it is not necessary to construct new theories to explain the lowering of the rate of growth: the explanation is to be found in chapter XIII of Vol. 3 of Marx's *Capital* where the phenomenon is called the falling rate of profit. The fall in the rate of growth is merely the consequence, at the level of material production, of this fall in the rate of profit;

2) that net investment is called, in Marxist terms, accumulation of capital and that it thus represents, as we have just shown, the *raison d'être* of industrial capital: «... the industrial capitalist becomes more or less unable to fulfil his function as soon as he personifies the enjoyment of wealth, as soon as he wants the accumulation of pleasures instead of the pleasure of accumulation» writes Marx (7). Fine «Marxists» are those who reproach the industrial capitalist for being unsuited to his purpose!

3) that this investment is made of the *surplus value* extorted from the minds and bodies of the proletariat cruelly regimented to work and live in an inhuman manner.

All of these curious «revolutionaries» therefore, reprove capitalism not for enslaving workers 50 hours a week or more, but for not accumulating enough; not for exploiting the proletariat but for the bad use of the fruits of this exploitation; not for its essence, but for not conforming sufficiently to this essence. They do not propose to abolish wage labour and surplus value, but to use them *more rationally, even more morally*. This is the economic program of the «left», from the social democrats to the national-communists, the left of *capital*.

One is reminded of the painful dilemma of Marx's slave-owner: «Whether to squander the surplus-product lashed out of his niggers, entirely in champagne, or whether to reconvert a part of it, into more niggers and more land» (8). Mr. Baran believes himself to be marxist because he is a partisan of the second solution!

The notion of surplus is merely the result and the summary of the vision of these advanced servants of capitalism: since capitalism does not produce all that it is able to produce one can go on to calculate all that it could produce if it was a good capitalism, well organised, planned and efficient. And since it does not produce this, it has thus been demonstrated that the system is bad and that it is necessary to change it —«change» evidently means replacing it with a system capable of producing the maximum, which one baptises «socialism». Before making this calculation, however, it is necessary to obliterate even the memory of Marxist theory. This is why Baran defines three different ideas: actual surplus, potential surplus, and planned surplus. We examine these one by one.

1) Actual Economic Surplus

This is the name given by the author to «the difference between the actual current production of society and its actual consumption» (p. 23). In Marxist terms, such a quantity corresponds to the accumulation of constant capital, in bourgeois terms to the net formation of capital or net investment: nothing new so far. However, taking the definition given, such an idea is purely empirical or descriptive and does not explain

(7) *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1954, p. 274.

(8) *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chap. 24, p. 609.

anything: its theoretical interest is thus precisely nil. On the other hand its political and ideological interest for « Marxists » such as Baran becomes apparent when he writes:

« Actual economic surplus has been generated in all socio-economic formations, and while its size and structure have markedly differed from one phase of development to another, its existence has characterised nearly all of recorded history » (p. 23).

And with this delightful (but sly) phrase, all of Marx's life and work are swept away. Forgotten are commodities, money, capital, surplus-value; forgotten is wage labour (even the word wage labour is ignored by Mr. Baran: it appears not once in his book); forgotten, in sum, is all of Marxist theory which (we will be excused if we remind the reader) is that of the capitalist mode of *production* and not that of a mode of utilisation of the net product (a utilisation which in any case is determined by the mode of production — as Engels, in his time, had to remind Herr Dühring). All good Marxists will therefore salute with us the amazing powers of abstraction of Mr. Baran; in making an abstraction of Marx's work, he has succeeded in making of him a theoretician of growth.

2) Potential Economic Surplus

This second idea is defined by Baran as

« ...the difference between the output that *could* be produced in a given natural and technological environment with the help of employable productive resources, and what might be regarded as *essential consumption*. Its realisation presupposes a more or less drastic reorganisation of the production and distribution of social output, and implies far-reaching changes in the structure of society. It appears under four headings. *One* is society's excess consumption (predominantly on the part of the upper income groups, but in some countries such as the United States also on the part of the so-called middle classes), the *second* is the output lost to society through the existence of unproductive workers, the *third* is the output lost because of the irrational and wasteful organisation of the existing productive apparatus, and the *fourth* is the output foregone owing to the existence of unemployment caused primarily by the anarchy of capitalist production and the deficiency of effective demand » (p. 23-24).

One has to admire this definition of unemployment proffered by a « Marxist » economist: the result of anarchic organisation and insufficient demand. Mr. Baran should have taken the pains to read *Capital*: he would have learnt that for Marx, unemployment, which is relative surplus population or the industrial reserve army, results inevitably from rising organic composition i.e. from the very movement of *capital*:

« This accelerated relative diminution of the variable constituent, that goes along with the accelerated increase of the total capital, and moves more rapidly than this increase, takes the inverse form, at the other pole, of an apparently absolute increase of the labouring population, an increase always moving more rapidly than that of the variable capital or the means of employment. But, in fact, it is capitalistic accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces in the direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant population of labourers i.e. a population of greater extent than suffices

for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus population...

« The labouring population therefore produces, along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus population; and it does this to an always increasing extent. This is the law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of production » (9).

Every relation revealed here; nothing to do with anarchy, nothing to do with demand. Moreover we can admirably understand the level of Baran's thinking when, a few pages further on, he talks of « the unemployment of human and *material* resources » (p. 39), and of the disgraceful waste of « human and *material* resources » (p. 37) (our emphasis). We obviously do not complain often enough about the suffering of these poor machines! Placing on the same plane humans and material, and not seeing in unemployment anything more than lost production — is just another illustration of the *technical* criticism of capitalism typical of petty-bourgeois university thought.

But passing on to the idea of « potential economic surplus », this really is a fairy tale. The potential surplus is that which could be the net product (corresponding to global surplus value) of capitalist society if it was more « rational », if it did not engender unemployment, or luxury production, or unproductive workers, or wastage; i.e. *if it were not in fact capitalist society at all*. This concept of potential surplus sums up the utopian petty-bourgeois dream of a capitalism bereft of wastage and obstacles to production, *exemplary, morally purified*. Such a concept is not even empirical as its predecessor was; it is purely a product of the imagination and on the scientific plane has thus about as much relevance as Father Christmas. Its only interest is, once again, ideological. It permits the synthesis of all of Baran's former falsifications in defining capitalism, not as a mode of production based on wage labour and surplus value, on the exploitation of the proletariat, but as a badly organised system which produces waste, gives rise to parasites and unproductive individuals, and which therefore does not invest all that it is capable of investing. One is naturally led to the conclusion that socialism is the opposite of all this. Not a mode of production in which wage labour and surplus value — and the categories which must inevitably give birth to them — are absent, but a regime which is not anarchic, which does not waste, has no unproductive workers, can invest to the maximum and thus permit maximum growth. It can do this because it is organised, i.e. *planned*. Which leads us to our third « surplus » and ties up the whole argument into a knot of mystification.

3) Planned Economic Surplus

This idea which can « only be applied to a socialist type of planning » represents

« ...the difference between society's « optimum » output attainable in a historically given natural and technological environment under conditions of planned « optimal » utilisation of all available productive resources, and some chosen « optimal » volume of consumption. The meaning and contents of the « optimum » involved are essentially

(9) *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chap. 25, p. 643 — The 3rd and 4th sections of Chap. 25 are devoted to relative overpopulation.

different from those attached to this notion in bourgeois economics. They do not reflect a configuration of production and consumption determined by profit considerations of individual firms, by the income distribution, tastes and social pressures of a capitalist order...

« Nor does this « optimum » presuppose the maximisation of output that might be attainable at any given time. It may well be associated with a less than maximum output in view of a voluntarily shortened labor day, of an increase in the time devoted to education, or of conscious discarding of certain noxious types of production (coal mining, for example). What is crucial is that the volume of output would not be determined by the fortuitous outcome of a number of unco-ordinated decisions on the part of individual businessmen and corporations, but by a rational plan expressing what society would wish to produce, to save and to invest at any given time » (p. 41-42).

In writing this Baran shows that for him socialism is defined purely and simply by *planning*. Whether the planning decides a rate of growth of 10% a year or a reduction in the length of the working day makes no difference to him. That it coexists with commodities, money, wage labour, is of no importance. Planning is the essence of socialism while disorder and uncontrolled decisions are the essence of capitalism.

Let us now try to unravel this cleverly tangled web.

1) Capitalist anarchy does not imply that each capitalist does as he pleases. All of Marx's work consists in showing that this anarchy has its iron laws, which impose themselves more or less consciously on individual capitals. Production is not determined by « tastes and social pressures » nor by the « unco-ordinated decisions on the part of individual businessmen »; the exact opposite is the case. Individual capitals cannot but obey the inherent laws of capitalism, imposed upon them by competition:

« Free competition brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist » (10).

It is thus the logic of the capitalist mode of production which determines the activity of producers and not the other way round (11). Planning in a social formation in which the fundamental relations of capital exist cannot but obey the laws of capital, and the illusions of the planners cannot alter this fact.

(10) *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chap. 10, p. 255.

(11) A century after the appearance of Vol. 1 of *Capital*, petty-bourgeois « Marxism », held enthralled by the capitalists, has not yet understood this elementary truth upon which Marx insisted many times in his work. From the Preface of the 1st German edition of *Capital*: « My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them » (p. xix); to Chapter 51 of Vol. 3: « The principal agents of this mode of production itself, the capitalist and the wage labourer, are as such merely embodiments, personifications of capital and wage labour; definite social characteristics stamped upon individuals by the process of social production; the products of these definite social production relations » (p. 857-8).

2) Gradually, as the centralisation which accompanies the development of capital proceeds, competition between capitals of an inferior calibre disappears, only to reappear at a higher level with increased violence until the highest limit constituted by national capital, is reached.

« In a given branch of industry centralisation would reach its extreme limit when all the individual capitals invested in it were fused into a single capital. In a given society the limit would not be reached until the moment when the entire social capital was united in the hands either of a single capitalist or of a single capitalist company » (12).

Trusts and monopolies therefore introduce a certain amount of planning into a branch of production which replaces the open competition between the capitalists of that branch. Competition then reappears between the trusts, as well as between the latter and those branches of production which are not monopolised, to appropriate the greatest possible portion of social surplus value. The capitalist state, acting as a board of directors of the company of capitalists of the nation (itself riven with tensions and internal struggles just as those existing among stockholders of any other company) eventually intervenes in order to substitute for competition, national planning of the allocation of the social surplus value and the production of the *country*. And at the same time that this is achieved, competition reappears with even more frenzied violence between *national capitals*. This process is only tendential. It is slow and uneven. The inferior levels of competition continue to exist, but on a more limited basis and within a margin of manoeuvre which is allowed to them by an overall organisation intended for a different and much more important struggle of the *entire* national capital. When an army goes to war, the quarrels between soldiers can only be tolerated insofar as they do not pose a risk to the strategic interest of the army as a whole: between 1939 and 1945 the Western powers were forced to plan their war effort — without being socialist for all that. The same was true for the capitalist economic reconstruction in the aftermath of the war. It was true for the international economic war which began to rage once again in the sixties. Conforming to Engels' provisions: with the approach of socialist society, capitalist society also makes use of a plan — the organisation of each national capital for the struggle between national capitals.

Merely because planning becomes possible (within national boundaries) in capitalist society after a certain level of development and concentration of capital has been reached, it does not suffice in order to define the mode of production as socialist. To repeat once again « that which is fundamental »: what is necessary is the destruction of capitalist relationships, the disappearance of commodities, money and wage labour, and, at the same time, *the reduction of the working day* — a fundamental measure which is the most concrete result, the most vivid illustration of the end of the wage slavery of a section of humanity. All of these measures will be taken by the dictatorship of the proletariat which intervenes despotically in the economy *by means* of planning.

To conclude: the only purpose of this « surplus » — whichever adjective it follows — is to destroy Marxist theory. In particular, the ideas of « potential surplus » and « planned surplus » contain all the distortions of

(12) *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 822.

the ideology which seeks to define capitalism as an irrational and inefficient system of production operating in the interests of a handful of big financiers and sabotaging economic growth, while socialism is a system which is organised, has eliminated waste, and thus, thanks to planning, permits maximum economic growth. This ideology is nothing other than the remains of the political economy of stalinism. Its function is, essentially, to obscure the fact that today, just as in Stalin's day, Russia is ruled in the economic domain by *all of the fundamental categories of capitalism*: commodities, money, wage labour and thus the frantic exploitation of the working class (13).

Baran's book shows that this falsification inevitably implies from the very start a revision and reversal of the theory from A to Z. It is very simply stated: Marxist theory — like all theory of consequence — forms a whole. In changing a single element, one must change it in its *entirety*; to defend it in its entirety we are therefore obliged to defend *each single element*. Those eager for novelty who do not understand this take us for purists and dogmatists: they do not see that the theoretical arm of the revolution must be fiercely protected if the revolutionaries are not to be disarmed.

II Marxist Scientific Method

Baran and Sweezy expound their conception of scientific method in their work entitled *Monopoly Capital*:

« Scientific understanding proceeds by way of constructing and analysing « models » of the segments or aspects of reality under study. The purpose of these models is not to give a mirror image of reality, not to include all its elements in their exact sizes and proportions, but rather to single out and make available for intensive investigation those elements which are decisive. We abstract from non-essentials, we blot out the unimportant to get an unobstructed view of the important, we magnify it in order to improve the range and accuracy of our observation. A model is, and must be, unrealistic in the sense in which the word is most commonly used. Nevertheless, and in a sense paradoxically, if it is a good model it provides the key to understanding reality » (p. 14).

Thus, Marx had elaborated a *model* of English competitive capitalism:

« Now Marx derived his theoretical model of the competitive capitalist system from the study of Britain, by far the richest and most developed capitalist country of his day » (p. 6).

Now, we no longer have competitive capitalism:

« We must recognise that competition, which was the predominant form of market relations in nineteenth century Britain, has ceased

(13) On all that concerns the Russian economy we refer the reader to our fundamental study *Struttura economica e sociale della Russia d'oggi* (Edizioni Il Programma Comunista, Milan, 1976) and in French to our study *Bilan d'une révolution*.

to occupy that position, not only in Britain but everywhere else in the capitalist world » (p. 6).

Thus, since the time of Marx

« the structure of the capitalist economy has undergone a fundamental change... the structural change from competitive to monopoly capitalism (p. 72).

Since Marxist analysis is no longer applicable in this era of the capitalism of monopolies, our two professors modestly propose to replace it by elaborating a « model » of monopoly capitalism. They thus betray their total lack of understanding of Marxist scientific method in general and of the role of competition in particular.

Competitive Capitalism and Monopoly Capitalism

We shall first see where the odd conception which describes competitive capitalism and monopoly capitalism as two systems of fundamentally different structures, and therefore governed by different *laws* (as our authors attempt to establish further on), can lead. Baran does not flinch from placing on the same plane the passage from feudalism to capitalism on the one hand and the passage from competitive to monopoly capitalism on the other:

« As the transition from feudalism to competitive capitalism led not only to a vast expansion of the economic surplus but also to a transfer of a large share of it from the feudal landlord to the capitalist businessman, the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism has resulted in a tremendous increase of the absolute value of the economic surplus and in the shift of control over it from the relatively small capitalist to a few giant corporations » (14).

Marx constructed the theory of a *mode of production* in which he explained that the change from one mode of production to another cannot be accomplished except by a violent revolution. Baran replaces modes of production by « economic regimes » which succeed one another sometimes violently and sometimes imperceptibly, and are distinguished from one another not by their *relations of production* but by the manner in which they make use of their economic « surplus ». For Marxists there is only *one mode of capitalist production* whose development consists of several phases but whose invariant essence is most concretely characterised by the existence of *wage labour*. The « Marxist » Baran has without doubt forgotten this first truth. But we already know why our professors rush to jump on the secondary aspect, monopolies: it is because their major worry is to avoid seeing the essential, *capital* and the fundamental relation which corresponds to it: *wage labour*.

This discovery of a new economic « regime » gives Baran and Sweezy the opportunity to further justify their term « surplus » (they pose a new « surplus » without a qualifying adjective. Is it actual? It is potential? Is it sometimes one and sometimes the other? One thing is certain, the authors themselves don't know either).

(14) *The Political Economy of Growth*, p. 60-61. The remaining quotes are from *Monopoly Capital*.

«The economic surplus is, in the briefest possible definition, the difference between what a society produces and the costs of producing it... In a highly developed monopoly capitalist society the surplus assumes many forms and disguises. [Note at foot of page: It is for this reason that we prefer the concept 'surplus' to the traditional Marxian 'surplus value', since the latter is probably identified in the minds of most people familiar with Marxian economic theory as equal to the sum of profits+interest+rent. It is true that Marx demonstrates... that surplus value also comprises other items such as the revenues of State and Church, the expenses of transforming commodities into money, and the wages of unproductive workers. In general however, he treated these as secondary factors and excluded them from his basic theoretical schema. *It is our contention that under monopoly capitalism this procedure is no longer justified, and we hope that a change in terminology will help to effect the needed shift in theoretical position.*]» (p. 10. Our emphasis).

If we understand correctly, according to Baran and Sweezy, it is no longer justifiable to attribute to the State, to unproductive workers, etc., a secondary role in the explanation and movement of capital and surplus value. There are however, *only* two ways of looking at the question:

— either surplus value is extorted by *industrial capital* which buys the commodity labour-power at its value in order to recoup, by its use in the process of production, a larger value than was paid — a *surplus value* — to be divided between the profit of enterprise, interest, and rent and finally redistributed among the many parasites such as the State, those engaged in unproductive activities, etc. In this case the State, those engaged in unproductive activities, etc., have only a secondary role, and the introduction of the category «surplus» merely confuses the issue;

— or else, if one wishes to attribute to the State *as such* (and not just in its role as a capitalist), and to other parasites, not a secondary but an essential role, it must be admitted that they themselves *directly* extort surplus value from the proletariat: we would be interested to know *how* they manage to do this. At all events, it can be seen that we have left the realm of the real world of the capitalist mode of production and have entered that of the «monopoly capitalist mode of production» or some other delirious invention to which the authors will not openly admit.

There is no third solution. In one case as in the other the term «surplus» once again serves to obliterate Marxist theory.

Whatever the pretext invoked, all attempts to make competition the discriminating element between the two supposedly fundamentally opposed systems is stupid for two reasons:

1) because the centralisation of capital, far from suppressing competition, does no more than depersonalise it and carry it to a higher level where it is waged with even greater violence;

2) because competition is not an element of the «structure» of capital (to use the jargon of the authors). This is so far from being the case that Marx, desiring to study *capital in general*, had, in Vols. 1 and 2 of *Capital*, to make an abstraction of competition. He only introduced the latter when, in Vol. 3, he redescended to the surface of the capitalist economy

in its conceptual reconstruction. «A scientific analysis of competition is not possible before we have a conception of the inner nature of capital» (15).

Competition can only in effect *execute* the laws of capital: it can neither explain nor change them:

«Competition executes the inner laws of capital; makes them into compulsory laws towards the individual capital, but is does not invent them. It realizes them. To try to explain them simply as results of competition therefore means to concede that one does not understand them» (16).

Thus has Marx pre-empted us. Baran and Sweezy have understood nothing either of capitalism or *Capital*.

Theory and Model

If our two professors have made such nonsense of the role of competition, it is in effect because they have not bothered to understand Marx's *method*. According to them, scientific method consists of constructing models of reality under discussion and then to establish the relationships between the elements of the model.

What is a model? It is a schematic representation of the salient aspects of the reality observed at a given moment, leaving to one side all that is secondary. What can it tell us? In the best of cases, a good description of a phenomenon bereft of all that is secondary or accidental. But to describe is not to explain. Such a method is *empirical*: it rests at the level of phenomenal appearance (free from all accidental disturbances). Now appearance is not scientific truth. On the contrary: «All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided» (17). What is more this method is not dialectic. It fixes the observed forms and prevents at the same time consideration of their movement and *transformation*.

Marx did something entirely different: his work does not consist of a model, but of a theory. Marx did not construct a model of English competitive capitalism: he *explained* the capitalist mode of production and its laws of development; he constructed its *theory*, and he *illustrated* this theory using concrete historical examples drawn from the capitalist society in which he lived (the only possible empirical verification in the social sciences when expounding theory):

«In this work I have to examine the *capitalist mode of production*, and the *conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode*. Up to the present time their classic ground is England. That is the reason why England is used as the *chief illustration* in the development of my *theoretical ideas*» (18).

Marx therefore gave us a theory and not a model. Not a schema but an explanation and exposition of the laws which govern the birth, movement and death of the capitalist mode of production. Far from being content with summarising what he saw, he searched for and found *scientific truth*,

(15) *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chap. 12, p. 255.

(16) *Grundrisse*, Penguin 1974 (paperback) edition, p. 752. Marx's remark is directed against Adam Smith.

(17) *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chap. 48, p. 817.

(18) Preface to the 1st German edition, Vol. 1, p. xvii (our emphasis).

which is often the complete opposite of the immediate interpretation suggested by outward appearances. To *explain*, he started by analysing the *elementary form* of capitalist social wealth: the commodity. And, on the basis of this elementary form he constructed the essential abstraction thanks to which he was then able to conceptually reconstruct the rest: value, which consists in essence of labour *in general* (abstract human labour). It was on the basis of this abstraction (without which it is impossible to proceed) that he developed the theory: value permits the explanation of the concrete forms of commodities and money and at the same time provides the secret of *capital*: value which begets value. Value, capital, surplus value, etc., are the *concepts*, the theoretical instruments which permit the *understanding* of the concrete forms which appear on the surface of capitalist society, their mutual relations, the laws of their movement and of their transformation. The theory is the explanatory discourse which permits us to *understand* the capitalist mode of production, to *know* its movement, thanks to our knowledge of its laws, and thus to *predict* the evolution of the concrete forms by which it manifests itself.

The « model » does not allow us to understand or predict, that is not its aim. It is the methodological symbol of the impotence of bourgeois social « science » which having long since given up explaining reality, is content when it succeeds in schematising and baptising appearances. The approach of our authors is the best example of this impotence. Having defined their method they proceed to its application in constructing their model of monopoly capitalism. Briefly, their reasoning is as follows:

1) The « typical unit » of present day capitalism is the « ideal type » of big firm or enterprise, characterised by the behaviour of its directors which have complete control of effective management, who themselves recruit their successors, and who ensure by a policy of self-financing the financial independence of the firm.

2) Empirical studies show that the objectives and the motivations of these directors are as follows: power, large growth-rates and sizes of enterprise.

3) That such objectives can only be maintained if there are very high rates of profit — even if personal enrichment is not the fundamental aim of these directors. Thus the objective of the big enterprise is profit.

4) What is monopoly capitalism? It is a system where giant corporations such as these are the dominant force.

This whole approach merely reverts to defining capital by describing the activities of its representatives. Even if the description is in places correct, this does not advance by one iota our *understanding* of the phenomenon. Twenty pages of the construction of a model result in this remarkable discovery: the objective of the giant corporation is profit. But *why* does it seek to make profit? Because, reply Baran and Sweezy, this is what is shown by a study of its directors. If poor Marx had been acquainted with the method of models, he would have been spared all his efforts! In place of writing thousands of pages it would have been sufficient for him to define competitive capitalism as a system of small enterprises directed by individuals eager to enrich themselves and, indulging in competition, succeed only in lowering their rates of profit. Explaining capital by its agents is just as stupid as explaining the State by its functionaries or a disease by its symptoms: it is however what bourgeois charlatanism has done for more than a century.

To complete this methodological masterpiece our two professors finish the construction of their 'model' in the following manner:

5) The relations between these big firms themselves and between them and other economic agents are market relations, and thus the relations of price: « ... the study of monopoly capitalism must begin with the workings of the price mechanism » (p. 53).

6) The thing which distinguishes monopoly capitalism is that the big enterprise is a « price maker » while under competitive capitalism the individual enterprise is a « price taker » (p. 53).

To commence the analysis at the level of price is obviously to prevent any further advance in the understanding of things as they are. It is a regression, not merely in comparison with Marx, but even compared with classical political economy who at least posed the question of *value* in order to explain *price*. The entire first volume of *Capital*, which our « Marxist » professors have been until now content with demolishing piece by piece, is here swept resolutely to one side *en bloc*. For them, capitalism can be explained at the level of circulation (19).

Marx constructed the *theory* of a *mode of production*; Baran and Sweezy describe certain parts of the process of circulation. In doing so they follow in the footsteps of vulgar political economists before them, but the latter at least had the grace not to pretend they were Marxists.

III The 'Laws' of Monopoly Capitalism

A stupid method produces stupid results — we could not really have expected otherwise. It becomes obvious that at the level of results, i.e. the « laws » discovered thanks to the Baran-Sweezy method, the confusion attains its height. These results and their demonstration can be summarised in the following way: competition, which manifests itself in forms other than a price war, obliges the monopolies to lower their costs of production; but being monopolies, they can fix their prices at the level that they desire. In this way their profit margins increase. It follows logically that under monopoly capitalism profits increase in value both absolutely and relatively (relatively in relation to the national revenue, that is). This is the « *law of increasing surplus* » (equated, for the purposes of argument, with profit), valid for monopoly capitalism, and which must be substituted for the law of the falling rate of profit, valid only for competitive capitalism.

This is so confused that we must retrace the argument step by step.

1) The Increase in Profit Margins

According to the authors, monopolies fix their prices at the desired level and concentrate on the other hand on lowering their costs of production. Thus under monopoly capitalism, profit margins increase:

(19) The authors, moreover, manifestly ignore the *process of production* of capital: « We are particularly conscious of the fact that this approach, as we have used it, has resulted in almost total neglect of a subject which occupies a central place in Marx's study of capitalism: the labour process » (p. 8). To see only the labour process in the capitalist process of production is to provide further evidence, if such were needed, of the authors' lack of understanding.

«...we have argued, that oligopolies succeed in attaining a close approximation to the theoretical monopoly price» (p. 67).

«The whole motivation of cost reduction is to increase profits, and the monopolistic structure of markets enables the corporations to appropriate the lion's share of the fruits of increasing productivity directly in the form of higher profits. This means that under monopoly capitalism, declining costs imply continuously widening profit margins» (p. 71).

Such an explanation is worth *absolutely nothing* because, resting as we have seen at the level of *phenomenal appearance*, it cannot but summarise the false interpretation suggested by this appearance. It is true that *one* or *some* monopolies can, by preventing the entry of new capitalists into their branch, escape the equalisation of the rate of profit (explained by Marx in the second section of Vol. 3 of *Capital*), and can thus ensure for themselves a monopoly superprofit. In doing this, however, they have not *created* this extra value, but *appropriated* value created by the labour-power employed by *other* capitals. And in a system with generalised monopoly in all branches, at the global level, such an explanation (Baran and Sweezy's) is completely useless since it reverts to saying that the entire system can create superprofits merely by increasing prices; in other words value can be created in the sphere of circulation.

If our authors had taken the trouble to read chapter V of Vol. 1 of *Capital* they would have avoided such a patent absurdity: Marx demonstrates therein, in his usual impeccable manner, that it is impossible to create value in the sphere of circulation (20). Thirty seconds reflection would be enough for a child to conclude that if tomorrow *everyone* decided to sell his commodity at a 10% higher price (including labour-power), this would enrich no one. Or else, if the only commodity which did not raise its price was labour-power, then the explanation of increased profit lies not in monopoly prices but in the increased exploitation of the working class, a general tendency of capital in which monopolies *as such* play no role in particular. But Baran and Sweezy are incapable of understanding this: if one makes profit then My Goodness! we have sold dearer than we bought. Here is the political economy of the grocer in all its splendour!

A solution to the problem remains to be found. If the profit margins of the large American corporations have, over a long period, a statistically justified, sustained rise (we are not implying that this is or is not the case) the explanation cannot be found in their policies on costs or on prices, but elsewhere. Without going into any great detail, we can see that Marxist theory offers several ways in which this might be achieved.

a) Monopoly superprofit: American monopolies may escape the equalisation of the rate of profit of American capitals and the equalisation of the

(20) The aim of the chapter entitled «The Contradiction of the General Formula of Capital». When we remember that this demonstration is an essential cornerstone of Marx's reasoning when passing from the general formula of capital to the illustration of the role of the commodity labour-power; that he stressed the question many times in Vol. 2 (chaps. 5 and 6) and Vol. 3 (4th Section); that the 1st section of Vol. 3 is entirely devoted to showing that profit is a mystified category, the disguise of surplus-value, it is disconcerting to have to waste time and paper to remind «Marxists» of these elementary truths.

world rate of profit (this last functions with more difficulty due to the lower mobility of capital at a world level). Monopoly superprofits thus realised *cannot but* be at the expense of other capitals, whether American or no, operating in the non-monopolised sectors. The raising of monopoly prices is merely the concrete form taken by a transfer of value:

«The monopoly prices of certain commodities... merely transfer a portion of the profit of other commodity producers to the commodities having the monopoly price. A local disturbance in the distribution of the surplus-value among the various spheres of production would indirectly take place, but it would leave the limit of this surplus-value itself unaltered» (21).

b) Superprofit from productivity: Following upon the increased productivity of labour-power, the individual value of a commodity may fall below its social value. The capitalist has only to sell it at its social value to pocket some extra profit. Such extra profits are realised in one branch of production be it at the level of the world market or of a national market:

«Capitals invested in foreign trade can yield a higher rate of profit, because, in the first place, there is competition with commodities produced in other countries with inferior production facilities, so that the more advanced country sells its goods above their value even though cheaper than the competing countries. Insofar as the labour of the more advanced country is here realised as labour of a higher specific weight, the rate of profit rises, because labour which has not been paid as being of a higher quality is sold as such. The same may obtain in relation to the country to which commodities are exported and to that from which commodities are imported; namely, the latter may offer more materialised labour *in kind* than it receives, and yet thereby receive commodities cheaper than it could produce them. Just as a manufacturer who employs a new invention before it becomes generally used, undersells his competitors and yet sells his commodity above its individual value, that is, realises the specifically higher productiveness of the labour he employs as surplus labour. He thus secures a surplus-profit» (22).

c) Superprofits arising from the export of capital:

«As concerns capitals invested in colonies, etc., on the other hand, they may yield higher rates of profit for the simple reason that the rate of profit is higher there due to backward development and likewise the exploitation of labour, because of the use of slaves, coolies, etc. Why should not these higher rates of profit, realised by capitalists in certain lines and sent home by them, enter into the equalisation of the general rate of profit and thus tend, pro tanto, to raise it, unless it is the monopolies that stand in the way» (23).

(21) *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chap. 50, p. 861. To this explanation the authors devote one phrase, by accident, when talking about something else (the intervention of the state). «... Extra large profits are gained not only at the expense of consumers but also of other capitalists» (p. 65). It does not occur to them that the explanation of superprofits lies here. We can see also that the word 'extra-large' indicates that we are in the domain of the plaintive economics of the petty-bourgeoisie, and not that of Marxist theory.

(22) *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chap. 14, p. 238.

(23) This passage follows directly on the last.

We will not elaborate upon these explanations, most particularly the last, since they are already widely known (cf. *Imperialism — the Highest Stage of Capitalism*). That the profit margins of giant American corporations are due at least in part to American imperialism which entangles the entire planet in chains is beyond dispute. And yet our two American «Marxist» professors have forgotten it.

2) The Absolute Increase in the Mass of Profits

Baran and Sweezy continue their argument by stating that growing profit margins imply an increase in the mass of profits:

« [such] continuously widening profit margins in turn imply aggregate profits which rise not only absolutely but as a share of national product. If we provisionally equate aggregate profits with society's economic surplus, we can formulate as a law of monopoly capitalism that the surplus tends to rise both absolutely and relatively as the system develops » (p. 71-72).

Our two professors obviously imagine that they have made a great discovery: *because* of monopolies, the mass of profit grows. Marx wrote:

« Thus, the same development of the social productiveness of labour expresses itself with the progress of capitalist production on the one hand in a tendency of the *rate* of profit to fall progressively and, on the other, in a progressive growth of the absolute *mass* of the appropriated surplus value, or profit; so that on the whole a *relative decrease* of the variable capital and profit is accompanied by an *absolute increase* of both. This two-fold effect, as we have seen, can express itself only in a growth of the total capital at a pace more rapid than that at which the rate of profit falls » (24).

Marx had established then the law of the augmentation of the mass of profits (or of surplus-value) one century ago. He demonstrated that it was an inherent tendency of capital necessitated by its movement of accumulation. Monopolies have nothing to do with the question. Our «Marxist» professors are really good: not only have they not discovered anything, they have succeeded in giving us a false explanation of a law already perfectly explained a hundred years ago.

3) The Relative Increase in Profits

According to the reasoning of the authors the increase in profits occurs not only in absolute terms but also in *relative* value i.e. « as a share of national product » (see above). Ignoring the total abandonment of Marxism which consists in referring to a completely mystified category belonging to bourgeois economics, and supposing that it was intended to mean the Marxist « social revenue » designated by $\Sigma(v+s)$, or the total sum of variable capital and surplus value for one year, we have the following:

To say that profits augment « as a share of national product » means purely and simply that the ratio $\Sigma s : \Sigma(v+s)$ increases. This relation never must be mistaken for the rate of profit which is not at issue here

(24) *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chap. 13, p. 223 (our emphasis).

until constant capital is introduced (25). The increase in this ratio is the result of the increase in the relation $\Sigma s : \Sigma v$ which is the *rate of surplus-value*. In other words, putting the best face upon it, all that Baran and Sweezy have « discovered » at the end of their tortuous and, in any case, incorrect reasoning is that the rate of surplus value increases — a fact illustrated by Marx long ago.

But to cap it all, even after attaining these dizzy heights of idiocy, not only do our professors not understand that they have discovered nothing new, they imagine that this « new » law is specific to monopoly capitalism and contradicts the law of the falling rate of profit (26).

4) The Law of Increasing Surplus

The conclusion of their demonstration, expurgated, accelerated, improved and reduced, gives the following:

« We can formulate as a law of monopoly capitalism that the surplus tends to rise both absolutely and relatively as the system develops.

« This law immediately invites comparison, as it should, with the classical Marxian law of the falling tendency of the rate of profit. Without entering into an analysis of the different versions of the latter, we can say that they all presuppose a competitive system. By substituting the law of rising surplus for the law of falling profit, we are therefore not rejecting or revising a time-honoured theorem of political economy: we are simply taking account of the fact that the structure of the capitalist economy has undergone a fundamental change since that theorem was formulated. What is most essential about the structural change from competitive to monopoly capitalism finds its theoretical expression in this substitution » (p. 71-72).

Here is a concluding reply to these final absurdities:

a) The law of the tendency of the *rate* of profit to fall (and not profit itself) has no « different versions » and does not presuppose « a competitive system ». It lies in the innate movement of capital itself which arises from the rise in organic composition and thus the growth in the productivity of labour:

« This mode of production produces a progressive relative decrease of the variable capital as compared to the constant capital, and

(25) Recalling that the rate of profit is represented by the formula $s/(c+v)$ in which c represents the constant capital advanced.

(26) One cannot deny to Mr. Sweezy a certain consistency in false ideas. He has contrived, for more than thirty years now, to disprove, by various means, this fundamental law of Marxist theory — starting with *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (London, 1946). In this work he substituted (with suitable modesty) for Marx's view — judged defective — an entirely different one based on the increase of wages due to accumulation. Later, in *Monopoly Capital*, he stated that this law was not false, but had lost its applicability. Today, we do not need to challenge his sillinesses at the level of theory, it suffices merely to hear the daily lament of the bourgeoisie that the rate of profit is falling in *practice* (the remedy to which they have found to be the lowering of wages). When Samuel Brittan, an economic commentator of the *Financial Times*, writes that « A falling productivity of capital is normally due to a rapid increase in capital per man, unmatched by correspondingly technical advances, leading to diminishing returns » (FT, 3 march 1977), he shows a better understanding of reality than all the Sweezys put together.

consequently a continuously rising organic composition of the total capital. The immediate result of this is that the rate of surplus-value, at the same, or even a rising degree of exploitation is represented by a continuously falling general rate of profit... The progressive tendency of the rate of profit to fall is, therefore, just an *expression peculiar to the capitalist mode of production* of the progressive development of the social productivity of labour » (27).

b) Furthermore, the law of a rising rate of surplus-value, that our « Marxists » call the « law of increasing surplus » because they do not understand the difference between the *rate of profit* and the rate of *surplus-value*, was established by Marx as a general law of capital: monopolies have nothing to do with it.

c) Finally, there is obviously no substitute for these laws: the law of the increase in the rate of surplus-value and the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. They cannot be contradictory since they both express, at different levels, the innermost essence of capitalism.

Only incredible simpletons could pack into such a few pages so great a number of stupidities. Well can Baran and Sweezy take their places among bourgeois university scholars!

We really lack the courage to make a final summary of all this foolishness. The reader is probably also exhausted after scaling these heights of university cretinism, and so we leave the last word to Lenin. Here is how he concluded a polemic against Tugan-Baranowski, who had also attempted in his own way to « improve » Marxism — the phenomenon is not new apparently — and, moreover, was much better acquainted with Marx's work than are Baran and Sweezy:

« The puzzled reader may ask: how could a learned liberal professor have forgotten these elementary axioms familiar to anybody who has read any exposition of the views of socialism? The answer is simple: the *personal* qualities of present day professors are such that we may find among them even exceptionally stupid people like Tugan. But the *social* status of professors in bourgeois society is such that only those are allowed to hold such posts who sell science to serve the interests of capital, and agree to utter the most fatuous nonsense, the most unscrupulous drivel and twaddle against the socialists. The bourgeoisie will forgive the professors all this as long as they go on « abolishing » socialism » (28).

A final word: of all the little academic woodgrub who owe their existence to and earn their living from gnawing away at revolutionary theory, those who camouflage themselves behind a disguise of Marxist vocabulary are the most dangerous and repugnant.

Party Interventions

Party Propaganda and Participation in the Workers' Struggles Against the Capitalist Offensive in Italy

Through the work of its sections and its union and factory groups our party was able to actively intervene in the recent workers' struggles against the Andreotti austerity plan. Our comrades worked in the traditional workers' organizations as well as in the rank and file committees where a proletarian reaction began to express itself against the politics of a class collaboration whose job it is to extinguish any sparks or flames of social unrest. These struggles were, in the end, literally smothered by the unified union confederations, with the left parties (including the CP) allowing the plan to pass in parliament by abstaining from the vote.

Our newspaper in Italy, *Il Programma Comunista*, made itself the voice of these magnificent struggles. Here we will limit ourselves to one example, that of the strike of October 28 at Ivrea, which is significant for the reaction of the workers as well as for the activity of our local section which has carried on its work with continuity for years.

The struggle began at the Montefibre plant. This factory employs about 1,600 workers, primarily women. There have been 600 layoffs since 1971 and the great majority of workers have been partially unemployed for 3 years because of a policy of rotation. Only one department (130 workers) works full time. It is from this department — when the workers learned that, like all the workers of the Montedison corporation, they would receive only 40 % of their October wages — that the struggle started.

On October 25, a general meeting of the workers decided to go on strike and hold a demonstration against the wishes of the union bosses. The union delegates arrived to prevent the workers from blocking the railroad tracks, but were obliged to agree to a meeting between the Montefibre strikers and the Olivetti workers. However, they were very careful to only let the Montefibre strikers go as far as the cafeteria, thus preventing a larger contact with the workers there. In the cafeteria, a union official, immediately supported by a member of the Olivetti Factory Committee, mouthed the classical refrain

(27) *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chap. 13, p. 212-213.

(28) Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 146-147.

on the necessity of investments and of the reorganization of Montefibre in order to thwart the manoeuvres of the corporation bosses (the reformists, especially the CP, have been trying to fool the workers with incredible tales that wage demands are « irresponsible » and the workers must ask for investments because these would pretendedly create work and combat inflation). Seizing the microphone, one of our comrades turned the discussion around. The problem, she said, was not limited to one factory, it was common to all: it is a question of the defense of wages, and it concerns the workers already hit by the crisis as well as those who are on the verge of feeling the crushing blow of the austerity plan; the Montefibre strike must become the general strike of the workers and, above all, those of Olivetti!

The atmosphere was charge. Upon the return of the Montefibre strikers, another very large meeting, another intervention of our comrades, another sharp clash with the union bosses, on points involving also the movement for immediate demands at the Standa supermarket. The next day our union group addressed the Olivetti workers through posters and on the 27th distributed a leaflet among their fellowstrikers of Montefibre recalling the repeated attacks of the employer against the living and working conditions of the workers and calling on them to organize themselves outside of the limits of factories and trades for the defense of wages, the defense of jobs, and the shortening of the workday with no decrease in wages.

On the 28th, for the four hour regional strike, the unions undertook in advance to move up the hour of the beginning of the strike and to hold the demonstration in the afternoon (instead of the morning as initially fixed) with the evident aim of limiting the participation of the workers as much as possible (the Olivetti workers would effectively be excluded). The demonstration was to leave however from the Montefibre gate. It is here that something occurred which was unforeseen by the unions. While the union bosses, upset by the presence of our union group in full force, did their best to mark time, our comrades urged the most combative elements to march, not in an orderly procession to the union headquarters or in order to « stir up public interest » but to join up with the Olivetti workers and to drive the scabs out of the Olivetti plant. Thus, at the first intersection the march broke into two: on one side the union bosses, the PCI (Italian Communist Party), the PDUP (a small left party), and some workers disoriented by what was happening; on the other side, us, the Montefibre workers, Lotta Continua, the students and half of Avanguardia Operaia.

Our demands were taken up by all: a general strike; complete wages for Montefibre; Olivetti-Montefibre, same fight! Upon arriving at Olivetti there was a demonstration inside the factory and a wholesale expulsion of the scabs, then a meeting. Our comrades drew lessons from the facts pointing out the rupture, even a physical one, which is produced between the combative workers on one hand and the unions and the opportunist parties on the other, and emphasizing that it was the tangible manifestation of a class rupture. The occupation

of the railroad station, decided unanimously, lasts about an hour; and Lotta Continua finally agrees to get wet, denouncing after us the sabotage of the PCI and of the union confederations.

This episode of working class reaction to a bourgeois offensive was a demonstration of proletarian force which, without the clever manoeuvres of the union bosses, could have become imposing. It showed the possibility of a spontaneous crystalization of militant working class nuclei around the class demands launched by the party, and of an authentic united front realized in the facts under the leadership — not « negotiated » but realized by « natural selection » — of the only political organization which remained firmly on course for all these years in the defense of the class principles, the class means, and the class methods against all those who abandoned them and betrayed them. It is through episodes like this — modest in the immediate, but destined to leave a mark and reproducing themselves inevitably on a more vast scale as the crisis deepens — that the independent struggle of the class will retake its difficult but glorious road.

Algeria : No to the Constitution ! Yes to the Class Struggle !

The following leaflet was distributed by our comrades in regard to the referendum on the Constitution, December 1976.

NO TO THE CONSTITUTION! YES TO THE CLASS STRUGGLE!

Once more, with its great campaign around the Constitution, the Boumediene regime tries to play on a mobilization of the masses. It does it with a double objective: to assure itself of popular support in the quarrel among the sections of the Algerian bourgeoisie, and to find an outlet for the growing dissatisfaction of the exploited masses.

WORKERS! COMRADES!

The Boumediene Constitution rests on enormous lies, and only by means of the material and ideological domination of the bourgeois state through its organizations of political control (the FLN, the mass organizations) and its bodies of repression is it possible for these lies to find an echo within the exploited and downtrodden masses.

While calling itself « socialist », the Constitution recognizes the right of property, which supposes a class society. Why in effect would it be necessary to protect, by means of the organized and centralized repression of the state machinery, a right of ownership of whatever

wealth if a non-possessing class did not exist which was to be denied access to this wealth?

The state is presented as an institution in the service of the « people », while in fact it is only the instrument by means of which the ruling classes assure the preservation of exploitation in the name of « socialism » and of Islam. Our brothers and sisters who rise up against the humiliating living conditions which daily oppress them have proof of this Marxist truth, and all those who in their turn will be pushed to raise again the challenge to the bourgeoisie will have to experience it.

This so-called « socialist » state even has an official religion. The hypocritical bourgeoisie, which occupies itself more with its earthly paradise than with « that of tomorrow », only waves the flag of Islam in order to better chain the exploited masses to inter-classist ideology and to better plunge them into the darkness of superstition.

WORKERS! COMRADES!

Our emancipation, or even the amelioration of our living and working conditions, does not depend on the establishment of, or the respect for, any Constitution! It depends only on our capacity to defend ourselves against capital — whether it be « private » or « public » — and against all its agents who endeavor to force us to submit to its shackles.

This is why it is indispensable for us to organize ourselves and to struggle against the ruling classes and their state in order to wrest from them:

- **SUBSTANTIAL WAGE INCREASES**
- **DECREASE OF WORKING HOURS**
- **WAGES TO UNEMPLOYED**
- **A REAL AGRARIAN REVOLUTION**
- **THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR**
- **THE RIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION**

WORKERS! COMRADES!

The realization of these demands will not by itself bring about the liberation of the workers from the capitalist yoke. However the struggle that they demand will constitute a groundwork where it is possible to forge the class force and solidarity through which one day, under the leadership of a true world communist party, the revolutionary emancipation of the proletariat can be realized.

FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CLASS PARTY!

FOR THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND DICTATORSHIP!

*International Communist Party
Algiers Group*

Summaries of Our International Press

PROGRAMME COMMUNISTE

No. 67 - July 1975 (88 pages)

- Cours de l'impérialisme mondial.
- **Projet de programme d'action du P.C. d'Italie, 1922.** Introduction (A propos des déformations de l'historiographie « de gauche ») ; Projet de programme d'action du Parti Communiste d'Italie présenté au IV^e Congrès de l'Internationale Communiste, 1922.
- Portugal : du 25 avril à l'austérité.
- Mise au point à propos de certains « dépasseurs de marxisme ».

No. 68 - October 1975 (68 pages)

- Le mythe portugais du double pouvoir.
- **Le marxisme et la Russie.**
- **La crise de 1926 dans le P.C. russe et l'Internationale (I).** Introduction ; Lettre d'A. Bordiga à K. Korsch (octobre 1926) ; La Gauche Communiste d'Italie face au débat dans le parti russe (I).
- La « relance de la consommation populaire » ou l'elixir du docteur Marchais.

No. 69-70 - May 1976 (108 pages)

- 1926-1976 : du socialisme dans un seul pays à la démocratie dans tous.
- La question agraire. Rapports du prolétariat et de la paysannerie dans la révolution communiste.
- **La crise de 1926 dans le P.C. russe et l'Internationale (II). Le VI^e Exécutif élargi de l'I.C.** Introduction ; Interventions d'A. Bordiga au VI^e Exécutif élargi de l'Internationale Communiste (février-mars 1926).
- En marge du X^e plan quinquennal : le mythe de la « planification socialiste » en Russie.

No. 71 - September 1976 (80 pages)

- Après les élections italiennes : polarisation ou convergence ?
- La fonction contre-révolutionnaire de la démocratie en Espagne.
- Gramsci, « L'Ordine Nuovo » et « Il Soviet » (I).
- Vérité et mensonge dans la constitution cubaine.

No. 72 - December 1976 (104 pages)

- Chine : la révolution bourgeoise a été faite, la révolution prolétarienne reste à faire.
- Le tournant des Fronts populaires ou la capitulation du stalinisme devant l'ordre établi (1934-1938).
- Gramsci, « L'Ordine Nuovo » et « Il Soviet » (II).
- Cours de l'impérialisme mondial.

No. 73 - April 1977 (104 pages)

- Changhaï, avril 1927 — Le bain de sang du prolétariat chinois arrose la victoire du stalinisme.
- Le tournant des Fronts populaires (II).
- **La crise de 1926 dans le P.C. russe et l'Internationale (III).**
- Idole de la « compétitivité », religion du taux de profit.

Summaries of Our International Press

EL PROGRAMA COMUNISTA

No. 19 - January 1976

- El mito de la dualidad de poder en Portugal
- El marxismo y la cuestión rusa
- El curso del imperialismo mundial (1)
- España: la burguesía y el oportunismo preparan el posfranquismo

No. 20 - May 1976

- 1926-1976: del socialismo en un solo país a la democracia en todos
- El curso del imperialismo mundial (2)
- Lucha revolucionaria, partido y militancia comunista
- La función histórica de la democracia en España

No. 21 - September 1976

- España, Italia, Portugal:
El poststalinismo latino, honra del stalinismo mundial
- Las Tesis de la Izquierda:
Introducción
El asalto de la duda revisionista a los fundamentos de la teoría revolucionaria marxista
El ciclo histórico de la economía capitalista
El ciclo histórico de la dominación política de la burguesía
- Al margen del Xº plan quinquenal:
El mito de la «planificación socialista» en Rusia
- Acerca de la Conferencia de los Partidos Comunistas de América Latina y del Caribe: Las vías que llevan a las cloacas de la historia
- Lo que distingue a nuestro partido

No. 22 - December 1976

- Desde el Líbano hasta Sudáfrica pasando por Europa: Las consecuencias extremas y devastadoras de la contrarrevolución staliniana
- Las Tesis de la Izquierda:
Introducción
El curso histórico del movimiento de clase del proletariado. Guerras y crisis oportunistas
- Propiedad y Capital
- Elementos de crítica política y de apreciación histórica de la Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria latinoamericana

No. 23 - March 1977

- La revolución burguesa china ya tuvo lugar; la revolución proletaria en China queda aún por hacer
- Comunismo, democracia y fascismo:
Introducción — La función de la socialdemocracia en Italia — Las vías que conducen al «nukismo» — Roma y Moscú
- Curso del imperialismo mundial
- La cuestión de las nacionalidades en España (1)
- Verdad y mentira en la Constitución cubana

Some Publications of the I.C.P.

● HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST LEFT

A comprehensive reappraisal of the formative process of a revolutionary Left wing within the Italian Socialist Party which gave rise to a definitely communist group. This group expressed the tendency which led towards the foundation of a party fulfilling all requirements established by the historical experience of Bolshevism and as stated by the Third International. Documentation is given supporting the essential statement that the theoretical and practical activity displayed by the real founders of the Communist Party of Italy, was a consistent application of some critical points of Marxist strategy and tactics —as restored by Lenin's work— to a specific and indeed typical western situation.

— In Italian:

— **Storia della Sinistra comunista** - Vol. 1 - 1912-1919: dalle origini, attraverso il primo conflitto imperialistico, all'immediato dopoguerra, 423 pages, \$ 7 or £ 3.00.

— **Storia della Sinistra comunista** - Vol. 2 - 1919-1920: dal congresso di Bologna del PSI al secondo congresso dell'Internazionale Comunista, 740 pages, \$ 9 or £ 4.00.

— **In French:** Chapters 8 and 9 of volume 2, dealing respectively with «The Marxist Left of Italy and the International Communist Movement» and «The Second Congress of the Communist International» have been translated into French in nos. 58, 59 and 60 of our international theoretical review «Programme Communiste» —see the list of publications in French.

● THE FUNDAMENTALS OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISM

The fundamentals of revolutionary communism defended against all anarchist and spontaneist deviations.

— **In English:** **The Fundamentals of Revolutionary Communism** - ref. A 1 - \$ 1.00 or 40 p.

— **In German:** **Die Grundlagen des revolutionären Kommunismus** - ref. D 4 - \$ 2.00 or 80 p.

— **In Spanish:** **Los fundamentos del comunismo revolucionario** - ref. E 1 - \$ 1.00 or 40 p.

— **In Italian:** **I fondamenti del comunismo rivoluzionario** - ref. I 1 - \$ 1.80 or 70 p.

— **In Portuguese:** **Os fundamentos do comunismo revolucionario** - ref. P 3 - \$ 1.20 or 50 p.

● PARTY AND CLASS

Party and Class: the Theses on the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution Approved by the Second Congress of the Communist International (1920), and some contributions by the Communist Left on the relationship between party and class, such as «Party and Class» (1921), «Party and Class Action» (1921), «Proletarian Dictatorship and Class Party» (1951).

— **In English:** **Party and Class** - ref. A 2 - \$ 1.00 or 50 p.

— **In French:** **Parti et classe** - ref. F 2 - \$ 2.00 or 80 p.

— **In German:** **Die Frage der revolutionären Partei** - ref. D 1 - \$ 1.00 or 40 p.

— **In Spanish:** **Partido y clase** - ref. E 3 - \$ 2.00 or 80 p.

— **In Italian:** **Partito e classe** - ref. I 4 - \$ 3.80 or £ 1.50.

ARTICLES PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH IN OUR FRENCH REVIEW « PROGRAMME COMMUNISTE »

No. 64 — October 1974:

- Marx - British Commerce.
- The Historical Path of British Labourism.

No. 65 — December 1974:

- Party and Class.
- The Conditions of Admission to the Communist International.

No. 66 — April 1975:

- «Proletarian Dictatorship» and «Socialist Society» in the New Chinese Constitution.
- Parliamentarism at the Second Congress of the Comintern (Introduction; Theses on Parliamentarism Presented by the Communist Abstentionist Fraction of the Italian Socialist Party; Theses on the Communist Parties and Parliamentarism Adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern; The Debate: Speeches of Bukharin, Bordiga, Lenin).

Price: 60 p./\$ 1.25 each - Order from: Editions Programme, 20, rue Jean-Bouton, 75012 Paris (France).

ORDER FORM

please return to
EDITIONS PROGRAMME
20, rue Jean-Bouton
75012 PARIS - FRANCE

● Please send me:

— the following publications:

— a yearly subscription to

(please specify if closed mail)

● Enclosed is a check of: payable to F. Gambini

● Name and address:
(capitals please)

« COMMUNIST PROGRAM » PUBLICATIONS

IN ENGLISH

* Series: « The Texts of the International Communist Party »:

1. The Fundamentals of Revolutionary Communism 40 p./\$ 1.00
2. Party and Class 50 p./\$ 1.00

IN FRENCH

* Review « Programme Communiste »:

- N^{os} 1-42 out of print
- N^{os} 45, 46, 47, 50, 56, 61 40 p./\$ 1.00
- N^{os} 43-44, 48-49, 51-52, 53-54, 55 70 p./\$ 1.80
- N^o 58 (192 pages) £ 1.00/\$ 2.50
- N^{os} 59, 60, 62, 63 50 p./\$ 1.15
- N^{os} 64, 65, 66, 67, 68 60 p./\$ 1.25
- N^{os} 69-70, 72, 73 80 p./\$ 1.50

* « Le Proletaire »

- Volume III (years 1972-1973) £ 3.00/\$ 7.00
- Volume IV (years 1974-1975) £ 3.00/\$ 7.00

* Series: « Les textes du Parti Communiste International »:

1. Communisme et fascisme, 158 pages 80 p./\$ 2.00
2. Parti et classe, 120 pages 80 p./\$ 2.00
5. La « Maladie infantile », condamnation des futurs renégats. Sur la brochure de Lénine « La maladie infantile du communisme », 100 pages 70 p./\$ 1.80
6. Force, violence, dictature dans la lutte de classes, 60 pages .. 40 p./\$ 1.00
7. Défense de la continuité du programme communiste, 224 pages dans lesquelles sont reproduits les textes fondamentaux de notre courant publiés de 1920 à nos jours £ 1.50/\$ 3.50

IN ITALIAN

* Storia della Sinistra comunista - Vol. 1 - 1912-1919: dalle origini, attraverso il primo conflitto imperialistico, all'immediato dopoguerra, 423 pages £ 3.00/\$ 7.00

* Storia della Sinistra comunista - Vol. 2 - 1919-1920: dal congresso di Bologna del PSI al secondo congresso dell'Internazionale Comunista, 740 pages £ 4.00/\$ 9.00

* Struttura economica e sociale della Russia d'oggi, 752 pages £ 4.00/\$ 9.00

* Series: « I testi del partito comunista internazionale »:

1. Tracciato d'impostazione — I fondamenti del comunismo rivoluzionario, 62 pages 70 p./\$ 1.80
2. In difesa della continuità del programma comunista, 200 pages £ 1.20/\$ 3.00
3. Elementi dell'economia marxista - Sul metodo dialettico - Comunismo e conoscenza umana, 125 pages £ 1.20/\$ 3.00
4. Partito e classe, 137 pages £ 1.50/\$ 3.50
5. « L'estremismo malattia infantile del comunismo » condanna dei futuri rinnegati, 123 pages £ 1.20/\$ 3.00
6. Per l'organica sistemazione dei principi comunisti, 198 pages .. £ 1.00/\$ 2.50

IN GERMAN

1. Die Frage der revolutionären Partei, 56 pages 40 p./\$ 1.00
2. Revolution und Konterrevolution in Russland, 86 pages 60 p./\$ 1.50
3. Der Kampf gegen den alten und den heutigen Revisionismus, 76 pages 60 p./\$ 1.50
4. Die Grundlagen des revolutionären Kommunismus, 90 pages .. 80 p./\$ 2.00
5. Was heisst es, den Marxismus zu verteidigen? £ 1.00/\$ 2.50

IN SPANISH

* Series: « Los textos del partido comunista internacional »:

1. Los fundamentos del comunismo revolucionario 40 p./\$ 1.00
2. Fuerza y violencia dictadura en la lucha de clase 40 p./\$ 1.00
3. Partido y clase 80 p./\$ 2.00

IN PORTUGUESE

* As lutas de classe em Portugal de 25 de Abril a 25 de Novembro .. 50 p./\$ 1.20

* Series: « Os textos do partido comunista internacional »:

1. Teses características do partido: bases de adesão 30 p./\$ 0.75
2. Lições das contra-revoluções 30 p./\$ 0.75
3. Os fundamentos do comunismo revolucionário 50 p./\$ 1.20

Orders: Editions Programme, 20, rue Jean-Bouton, 75012 Paris (France).

Payment by check or international money order to F. Gambini, or by payment to account n° 9831-14 (M. Gambini), Banque Nationale de Paris, 20, boulevard de Vauglirard, 75015 Paris (France).

communist program

review in English

Yearly subscription : £ 2.00 / \$ 4.00

programme communiste

theoretical quarterly review (in French)

Yearly subscription: £ 3.20 / \$ 7.00

le prolétaire

bi-weekly newspaper (in French)

Yearly subscription: £ 3.00 / \$ 6.50

il programma comunista

bi-weekly newspaper (in Italian)

Yearly subscription : £ 3.50 / \$ 7.50

el programa comunista

quarterly review (in Spanish)

Yearly subscription: £ 1.60 / \$ 3.20