Massacres in Sudan

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After a two-year siege, RSF paramilitary forces (the Rapid Support Forces of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedtti) captured El Fasher, the large city in Darfur, on October 26, followed by the massacre of thousands of civilians (especially in hospitals). Their opponents, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), were likewise accused of ethnic cleansing, massacres of civilians, and rape in Darfur and other provinces.

In response to international outrage over the massacres in El Fasher, Hemetti ordered the arrest of the RSF commander who had boasted on the social network TikTok that he had killed more than 2,000 civilians. This measure, however, is nothing more than a smokescreen, as RSF units have committed further acts of violence against the civilian population during the ongoing clashes – from attacks on refugee camps to blocking humanitarian convoys. Moreover, since their very inception, they have borne responsibility for a bloody history of massacres.

These units, recruited from Muslim ethnic groups in Darfur, were created under the name Janjaweed by dictator Omar al-Bashir to fight rebel organizations in Darfur itself and also in the south of the country. They are thus responsible for numerous killings of the black population. They also violently repressed urban demonstrations in 2013, when hundreds of demonstrators protesting against the government's austerity measures were killed and injured.

On April 11, 2019, during the wave of uprisings against al-Bashir's regime that had begun several months earlier, the RSF, together with the SAF (regular military forces), overthrew the dictator who had been in power for 30 years. After negotiations with opposition forces grouped in the FFC (Forces of Freedom and Change), they formed the so-called Transitional Military Council (TMC), which was to administer the country: the aim was to secure the bourgeois order shaken by demonstrations and uprisings against the dictatorship.

Although the troops of the TMC repeatedly and violently repressed the ongoing demonstrations, massacring hundreds of people, the democratic opposition of the FFC signed a "constitutional declaration" with it in July with the aim of re-establishing civilian government. This declaration was presented as a victory for the "Sudanese revolution"; but in reality, it was the result of discreet negotiations under the patronage of the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom (the former colonial ruler). Eventually, after difficult negotiations accompanied by brutal repression, Abdullah Hamdok was appointed civilian prime minister, while the presidency went to General al-Burhah, head of the SAF, and Hemedtti became deputy chairman of the transitional government.

During its tenure, this transitional government carried out a series of anti-proletarian attacks aimed at restoring the proper functioning of Sudanese capitalism—for example, it abolished subsidies on basic goods. But when further deterioration of the situation once again pushed the masses into struggle, despite the democrats' attempts to calm things down, al-Burhan and Hemedtti dissolved the government on October 25, 2021, arrested the prime minister and opposition party leaders, and declared a state of emergency...

Although al-Burhan and Hemedtti were in complete agreement on abandoning the agreements reached with the democrats and ending the so-called "revolution," each of them in fact represented different political-economic interests. The SAF, supported by the Islamist forces that had backed the al-Bashir regime, wanted to integrate the RSF into the army and thereby end their control over part of the gold extraction and various smuggling networks they had built. Disputes between these two former pillars of the dictatorial regime gradually escalated into open war in 2023, and at present there are two rival governments, each controlling part of the country.

The clashes have caused enormous damage to infrastructure, destroyed the economy, claimed tens of thousands of lives, and driven nearly 12 million people from their homes, 3 million of whom have settled in neighboring countries (out of a total population of roughly 40 million). They have also caused an economic crisis in South Sudan due to the interruption of oil exports—its main source of its wealth—which must pass through Sudan.

Since the beginning of the Sudanese uprising, states in the region and imperialist powers have sought to maintain order in Sudan—a country occupying a strategic position in this turbulent area—by providing generous loans to the TMC and subsequently to the interim government.

The most powerful actors rushed to the aid of the bourgeois order in Sudan: the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were at the forefront, temporarily setting aside their mutual rivalries because the risk of unrest spreading if military power fell was too great. Once the threat of mass uprising had been averted, each state began to support one side or the other in the conflict according to its own interests.

Egypt, which has historically sought to draw Sudan into its sphere of influence, strongly supports the SAF militarily, as does Russia, which has not forgotten al-Bashir's promises to allow it to establish a naval base in Port Sudan and therefore acts as a mouthpiece of the SAF, which controls this port city, at the diplomatic level (although the Russian Wagner Group initially cooperated with the RSF.) Turkey has officially sided with the SAF, supplying them with drones, as has Iran, while Saudi Arabia, which has significant interests in Sudan, pretends to be neutral.

In contrast, the United Arab Emirates is the main supporter of the RSF, with which it has numerous ties; mercenaries and weapons (with links to Ukraine) flow to the RSF via Chad, Somalia, and Libya (an area controlled by Haftar). The RSF is also supported by Kenya, South Sudan, and Ethiopia, Egypt's long-standing rival.

As for Western imperialism: BNP-Paribas, France's largest bank, became the "de facto central bank" of Sudan at a time when al-Bashir's regime was accused of genocide in Darfur (for BNP, the massacres represented a fantastic opportunity to increase its profits). However, it appears that it did not continue its activities after the fall of the regime. After years of arms embargoes against Sudan, the European Union, together with the UN, declared a more limited embargo on arms destined for Darfur, but even these embargoes are not strictly observed, as evidenced by the presence of French, Bulgarian, and Chinese weapons in the hands of RSF fighters—according to general opinion, these weapons are sold through the United Arab Emirates. And since the United Arab Emirates is a major investor in the United Kingdom and France, and also has important economic and military relations with Italy, Germany, and Spain, it is obvious why London is putting pressure on African states that are trying to condemn these facts, and why Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Madrid refuse to criticize the UAE. The same is true of Beijing, the UAE's main trading partner. In addition, the European Union has provided subsidies to the RSF to prevent migrants from traveling to Europe. Is it any wonder, then, that European countries remain silent about the UAE's support for the RSF?

The United States, on the other hand, did not hesitate to criticize the United Arab Emirates' involvement in the civil war in Sudan—even though it has a number of military bases on its territory and has signed numerous bilateral agreements with it in the field of security and the "fight against terrorism." The United States did not involve itself in the conflict between the RSF and the SAF, limiting itself to calls for a ceasefire through the mediation of a "quartet" composed of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates: for all these actors, the priority is to eliminate any risk of "destabilization" in the region.

Since the end of 2018, Sudan has experienced a major uprising against a dictatorial regime that introduced drastic austerity measures with the aim of restoring the health of capitalism. This movement, which followed on from that of 2013, drew in broad masses of the population, who bravely resisted repression. The movement forced the military authorities to get rid of the dictator himself and some of his cronies, causing panic among the rulers of neighboring countries. Despite its mass character, however, it was unable to go beyond a superficial cleansing of the bourgeois order: the alleged "revolution" brought nothing but very meagre and temporary concessions on the part of the former protagonists of al-Bashir's regime, before any possibility of further resistance was crushed. The discrepancy between the apparent strength of the mass movement and the insignificance of its results—both political and immediate economic—can be explained by the democratic and pacifist orientation imposed on it by the petty-bourgeois currents that “naturally” placed themselves at its head.

These currents never sought anything other than to negotiate—while hoping for the support of the imperialist “democracies”—a transition to a parliamentary civilian government, as if it were for this pitiful goal that thousands of protesters had shed their blood and sacrificed their lives!

The working class is undoubtedly numerically weak and stifled by decades of dictatorship, yet it nevertheless exists. However, instead of being the driving force and leadership of the uprising, it appeared throughout this period only as an indistinguishable component of “the people” alongside other classes: this was, after all, prescribed to it by the leaders of the new trade unions and the Sudanese Communist Party. The latter, communist only in name, even supported laws restricting freedom of trade-union organisation so as not to jeopardise its alliance with the bourgeoisie.

This interclass, democratic, and pacifist orientation—to which the interests of the proletariat were sacrificed—could only sterilize the uprising, facilitate repression, and leave the bourgeoisie free to firmly gain control of the situation after the movement's first setback. The policy of interclass collaboration is always synonymous with the defeat of movements, even those that are very massive, full of protests and mass uprisings. In the conditions of a very poor country like Sudan, where there are no social shock absorbers, the regaining of control of the situation can only be particularly brutal, and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie can impose itself without any tricks. But this harsh lesson applies to all countries: if the proletariat does not want to be the eternal plaything of the bourgeoisie, if it does not want to suffer crushing defeat in great revolutionary movements, it must organize and fight on an independent class basis, not allow itself to be lulled by the siren songs of "popular unity," with the indispensable reconstitution of its class party—the only one capable of rallying the masses of the oppressed and exploited and leading them to final victory over capitalism.

Only then will the endless series of massacres of this bloody bourgeois order come to an end—and all its countless victims be avenged.

Il comunista - le prolétaire - el proletario - proletarian - programme communiste - el programa comunista - Communist Program