Syria. Rojava: the failure of the Kurdish confederalist “revolution”

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On January 30, 2026, after more than twenty days of fighting, an agreement was reached between the Syrian government, led by former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa since the fall of Bashar al-Assad a year earlier in December 2024, and the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish militia that controlled the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), better known as Rojava, Mazloum Abdi. While, officially, the bourgeois Kurdish parties of the Middle East welcome this agreement, which avoids civil war, maintains local “autonomy” in the region, and guarantees the “national rights” of the Kurdish minority (1), in reality, there is little doubt that the Syrian president's victory marks the probable end of the Kurdish national project—supposedly revolutionary and based on the principles of democratic confederalism—in its most advanced stronghold, Syrian Kurdistan. This defeat of the SDF is only the latest stage in a long decline of the Kurdish national struggle, a key stage of which was the announcement of the disarmament and then dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the main Kurdish political organization based in Turkey, by its historic leader, Abdullah Öcallan, in the spring of 2025. These two events, far from being isolated—insofar as the SDF's failure can be explained in part by the lack of support from the rest of the Kurdish movement, which was determined to preserve the "peace process between the PKK and Turkey—are a source of major lessons for Marxist revolutionaries, both in terms of imperialist rivalries in the Middle East and the collapse of one of the greatest myths of the so-called “far left” of the first third of the 21^st century, that of a Kurdish confederalist “revolution.”

The Kurdish people, estimated to number between 42 and 48 million according to the latest estimates, including 15 to 18 million in Turkey and 2.5 to 3 million in Syria, are historically a nomadic people, comprising shepherds, herders, and farmers, concentrated in the region of Kurdistan, a territory with shifting borders due to the geographical and morphological characteristics of the region, now divided between four states: Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. A minority in each of these states, they have been victims of social and national oppression for over a century, facilitated by the seizure of Kurdish-inhabited territories during the two world wars and the historical evolution of the balance of power between the imperialist powers, all of which used the Kurds as pawns in their imperialist rivalries, from the United Kingdom to the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Kurds have been persecuted by various states that have imposed forced sedentarization on these populations in order to better control them. Under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in 1937-1938, tens of thousands of Kurds were massacred, subjected to aerial and artillery bombardment, poison gas, and the burning of forests and caves where civilians and combatants had taken refuge, in order to put an end to a revolt that had broken out in 1936 in the mountainous region of Dersim. Faced with massive and almost constant repression, the Kurds gradually developed a national consciousness, but its growth was hampered by two major factors. First, while large numbers of Kurds from Turkey, subjected to persecution, emigrated to European countries, particularly Germany, where they became proletarians, constituting a significant part of the Turkish proletariat in the diaspora, the traditional social organization, based on the patriarchal family and the tribe, continued to maintain itself in the Kurdish regions. Economic and social backwardness and the isolation of the tribes prevented the maturation of the material conditions necessary for the emergence of a modern revolutionary movement—which could only have been bourgeois—across Kurdistan. Geographically and linguistically divided, the Kurds have therefore never managed to carry out a bourgeois revolution, the aim of which would have been to establish a unified national state. In Turkey, they did not have the strength to oppose Kemal's armies in order to establish the state promised in this part of Kurdistan by the victorious imperialist powers in the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which organized the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. After Kemal's armies defeated the French, Armenian, and Greek troops, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 sanctioned the new regional architecture, in which there was no longer any place for a Kurdish state. And until after the last world war, no political party embodied the Kurdish national struggle. The lack of revolutionary perspective allowed, despite sometimes courageous struggles, the massacre of populations who resisted the oppression of the Turkish and Iranian states, which were keen to maintain their domination over regions of major geostrategic interest due to their importance as transit routes between Europe and Asia and their significant deposits of raw materials.

The first Kurdish political organizations were formed around wealthy families with a peasant social base. Seeking the support of European powers and the USSR, they promoted the establishment of a confederated Kurdish republic rather than a centralized state. The first party to seek to unite the entire Kurdish population was the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), founded in 1946 by Mustafa Barzani, who sought support first from the United Kingdom and then from the USSR. Decades later, the 1979 revolution in Iran provided an opportunity for Kurdish political parties, such as the Maoists of Komala, the KDP, and the People's Fedayeen Party, to unite on a common platform demanding autonomy for Iranian Kurdistan, recognition of the Kurdish language, decentralized administration, including for the police, and freedom of religion, press, association, and organization.

Wars in the Middle East have often been an opportunity for Kurdish groups, particularly in Iraq, to support the side opposed to the state that oppresses them, in the hope that the victor will grant them a degree of autonomy. This was first the case during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, when the Iraqi government nevertheless managed to maintain its grip on Kurdistan, but even more so during the Gulf War of 1991, when Iraq's defeat allowed Kurdish organizations to “liberate” the cities of Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, and Mosul. However, despite the hopes placed in the Western imperialist powers, the latter allowed the Iraqi government to regain control of the region through terrible massacres, during which the Iraqi army did not hesitate to use napalm and chemical weapons, at the cost of tens of thousands of deaths and the exile of millions of inhabitants to neighboring regions of Iran and Turkey. As proof of the boundless cynicism of the imperialist powers that proclaim themselves friends of the Kurds, at the request of Turkey, which is seeking at all costs to prevent thousands of Kurdish refugees from entering its territory, they entrusted Saddam Hussein with the task of restoring order by guaranteeing the Kurds a pseudo-autonomy. The sworn enemy of yesterday becomes the executor of tomorrow's dirty work…

But it would be wrong to view Kurdish political organizations as mere dupes, constantly betrayed by imperialist powers. The latter, too, do not hesitate to resort to the most cynical bargaining, even if it means weakening their own cause. Thus, during the 1990s, Iraqi Kurdish parties entered into agreements with Turkey in which they undertook to prevent the settlement and organization of Kurds in Turkey. At the same time, between 1994 and 1996, an internal struggle between Kurdish factions resulted in the victory of the KDP of the Barzani family, supported by Baghdad, over the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of the Talabani family, supported by Iran. To add insult to injury, the Iraqi secret services took advantage of their victory alongside the KDP to assassinate opponents who had taken refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, several of whom had worked for the CIA before being abandoned in 1991 when the United States decided it was preferable to let Saddam Hussein control the region rather than see Iran take it over. The history of the Kurds throughout the 20th century can therefore be summed up by the following equation: the congenital inability of Kurdish organizations to wage a national struggle + ever-betrayed trust in the hypocritical proclamations of imperialist sponsors = inevitable disillusionment and mass slaughter. A change in protagonists with the arrival on the scene of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian satellites, and the Rojava experiment between 2012 and 2026, which we will now examine after this lengthy but necessary recap, were not about to change the situation.

Founded in November 1978, the PKK is a Kurdish nationalist political organization and armed guerrilla movement operating from Turkey, with branches among the Turkish diaspora in Europe. It originally espoused a Stalinist-Maoist ideology and waged a guerrilla war for the creation of a Turkish Kurdistan. Its apparent radicalism and commitment to armed struggle, which contrasted with the moderation and corruption of traditional Kurdish organizations, initially ensured it a certain degree of success in responding to the anger of Kurds subjected to genuine oppression by the Turkish state, which repressed any attempt to speak Kurdish or organize autonomously. With the fall of the Eastern Bloc and the disappearance of its Soviet sponsor, the PKK abandoned all references to Stalinist Marxism and turned to Islamism. At the same time, it renounced the independence of Turkish Kurdistan in favor of simple autonomy and multiplied offers of negotiations with the Turkish government, going so far as to approve the vote of confidence of Kurdish deputies in the center-right government of Tansu Çiller, who would show his gratitude by destroying and burning Kurdish towns and villages and multiplying extrajudicial executions.

From 2005 onwards, the party once again changed its political orientation by adopting “democratic confederalism,” inspired by the principles of anarchist theorist Murray Bookchin, who was denounced even within his own movement for his moderation and possibilism (!). Officially, the aim was to promote direct democracy, grassroots decision-making, and the “socialization” of the economy—in reality, the very classic bourgeois self-management where bosses are elected and can be dismissed by the workers, while wage labor, the production of goods, and trade between companies are maintained—and a federation of communes. In short, a project for a Swiss-style cantonal “revolution,” bourgeois democratism at its finest, and an endless repetition of old libertarian and self-management myths, which have repeatedly proven their harmfulness to the proletariat but which die hard.

The PKK's political trajectory since the 1990s could be defined as one of invariable defeatism. Long protected by the Baathist regime of Hafez al-Assad, which allowed it to use the Kurdish regions of Syria as a rear base (and which the PKK thanked by collaborating, according to its opponents, with the Syrian secret services in repressing opposition to the regime), it was abandoned by his ally during the rapprochement between Syria and Turkey. The PKK was expelled from Syria and its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured by the Turks, with the help of the United States. In 1999, following his capture and subsequent death sentence, which was later commuted to life imprisonment, Öcalan disavowed his party's guerrilla warfare, asked Turkish society for forgiveness for his party's terrorist actions, and offered to surrender his movement. His “democratization plan” included recognition of the Kurdish language and culture, constitutional recognition of Kurdish citizenship, and increased power for local elected officials. In exchange, the movement pledged to end its armed struggle and respect the integrity of the Turkish state. Only Turkey's refusal, whose favorable balance of power meant it did not need to negotiate with a much weaker opponent, and which instead chose to launch a campaign of terror against the Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iraq, explains why the PKK was forced, against its will, to continue the struggle. (2) At the beginning of 2013, the party once again called on its supporters to lay down their arms as part of a new peace process, which proved just as short-lived as the previous one, and by July 2015, fighting had resumed between the PKK and the Turkish army.

Finally, in the last stage of this long litany of offers of surrender, Öcalan called from prison in February 2025 for an end to the armed struggle and the dissolution of the PKK; this appeal was welcomed by the party leadership, which announced a ceasefire with the Turkish army the following month before officially dissolving in May 2025. Today, the “peace” negotiations are still ongoing, and the PKK militants' desire not to hinder them likely explains the reluctance to support their Syrian sister party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), during the al-Sharaa regime's offensive.

ROJAVA, A SHOWCASE FOR DEMOCRATIC CONFEDERALISM AND A REVELATION OF THE DEAD END OF THE KURDISH PSEUDO “REVOLUTION”

Founded in 2003, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) is the Syrian branch of the PKK. During the 2011 uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which marked the beginning of nearly 14 years of civil war, the PYD distinguished itself from other Kurdish organizations in Syria by refusing to join the opposition to the regime and by seeking to maintain contact with Assad. Controlling de facto Syrian Kurdistan since the departure of Bashar al-Assad's troops in 2012, redeployed by Assad to regions where the uprising was at its height, the PYD gradually established a veritable iron curtain over the region, engaging in bloody conflicts with Islamists from the Al-Nusra Front and pro-Western rebels from the Free Syrian Army to preserve control of the region. It violently repressed peaceful demonstrations organized by political opponents, as in June 2013 in Amouda, where several demonstrators were killed and opponents kidnapped. (3) Translated into the language of Anarchists—who are among Rojava's main admirers in the West, along with almost all “far-left” groups – this bloody militarism becomes a call for local populations to “self-defend themselves socially, to coordinate their popular militias, to rely only on their own forces [...] to protect their territory and their lives and repel the Jihadists.” (4)

The support that Rojava has received from the bourgeois left and far left in the West—which was confirmed during last January's offensive with the formation of “caravans” supposedly to support Rojava and show international solidarity, a farcical replay of the tragedy of the Stalinist International Brigades' participation in the Spanish Civil War— with a program of braiding hair in the style of Kurdish female fighters and dancing in front of border guards—can be explained by the supposed democratic confederalist revolution that emerged in Rojava in 2013. On paper, this peaceful Swiss-style “revolution” with its organization into cantons and “people's councils,” its ecological projects, and its mixed male-female leadership has everything to appeal to defrocked Stalinists, Trotskyists eager to fill their list of “progressive,” “anti-imperialist,” or “workers'” regimes, and libertarian possibilists.

But in reality, Rojava presents a completely different picture. Behind the façade of “direct democracy” where decisions are supposedly made by the communes, real political power lies in the hands of the leaders of the quasi-state of the AANES (Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). While the municipalities are content to manage strictly local issues such as the distribution of fuel or food, garbage collection, and the management of neighborhood or family conflicts, the PYD places its activists at the head of the three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—each represented by a council whose members are appointed. In addition, the PYD has a monopoly on the police and the army and does not hesitate to use them for repressive purposes against the local population. Thus, in addition to the repression of the Amouda demonstration in 2013, the SDF has regularly resorted to kidnapping opponents. In February 2021, a peaceful demonstration protested against the kidnapping of teachers (!) by the SDF on the pretext that they had refused to implement the new school curriculum. Rojava also imposed conscription in the summer of 2014, not hesitating to forcibly recruit minors and arrest those who refused. In Manbij, the introduction of conscription in May 2018 led to a general strike, with order subsequently being restored by the People's Protection Units (YPG), the PYD militia, with the support of US soldiers. A new general strike broke out in 2021 for the same reasons, compounded by economic hardship and discrimination against Arab populations, resulting in eight people being shot and wounded by the authorities. In the same year, journalists were arrested for covering a demonstration against the recruitment of minors to serve in Kurdish armed militias. (5)

Economically speaking, Rojava is a capitalist regime like any other. Private property is recognized in the AANES constitution, and most of the economy operates on a mixed model, such as electricity, gas, or oil, which are distributed either by AANES commissions or by private companies run by PYD affiliates. Rojava's main sources of income come from energy distribution, taxes, and customs duties. While most workers are employed directly by the AANES, the private capitalist sector, represented by venture capitalists, businessmen, and landowners, has experienced significant growth due to the real estate boom and commercial opportunities offered by the regional administration to private capital. Several representatives of this business bourgeoisie have even obtained positions of responsibility in the administration. Like any capitalist regime, the AANES was “forced,” once it was confronted with inflation and declining revenues, to raise the prices of food and energy, provoking major social struggles that it violently repressed in its capacity as representative of the bourgeois order. In May 2021, the AANES decided to increase fuel prices, sparking protests in several cities, including Amoude and Deir ez-Zor, which it brutally and bloodily suppressed, killing at least five people. The following year, Kurdish police forces imposed a curfew and arrested protesters in Raqqa who were demonstrating against the deterioration of their living conditions. (6)

Finally, adding further gloom to an already bleak picture for the region's proletariat, Rojava has adopted a policy of systematic discrimination against the local Arab population. The PYD has thus been responsible for the destruction of entire Arab villages and ethnic cleansing, under the pretext that they were harboring members of the Islamic State. (7) Is it any wonder, then, that dozens of Arab demonstrators gathered to celebrate the departure of the SDF from the city of Raqqa following the advance of al-Sharaa's troops? (8)

“The initial mission of the SDF as the main anti-Islamic State force on the ground has largely come to an end, as Damascus is now ready to take over security matters, particularly the control of IS detention centers.” (9) It is difficult to be more cynical, and at the same time more honest, than this statement by the US special envoy for Syria, Republican Tom Barrack. These statements are enough to understand the resounding defeat of the SDF and the PYD at the hands of the Syrian regime: it can be explained by the fact that the US sponsor has, once again, abandoned its Kurdish allies now that their usefulness is coming to an end.

For nearly a decade, the SDF has been the Americans' main proxy in the region in their fight against the Islamic State. After deciding in 2013 that the overthrow of the Baathist regime risked destabilizing the region and replicating the situation in Libya, due to the failure of the opposition forces to the regime to embody a solid and reliable alternative, the United States, while supporting the so-called moderate Islamist opposition forces to the regime, sought above all to focus on eradicating the Islamic State (ISIS) in the region, a task they entrusted to their Kurdish auxiliaries. The SDF thus benefited from US assistance in training its fighters and providing military equipment, including weapons and Humvee armored vehicles (10). In addition, the US-led Western coalition provided air support to Kurdish troops on the ground, while French and British Special Forces “military advisers” were discreetly present on the ground alongside the Americans (11). This support, initiated by Obama, has withstood changes in administration and continued under Trump's first term and then under Joe Biden.

The United States can boast that it backed the right horse, because in October 2017, the SDF succeeded in recapturing the city of Raqqa from the Islamic Caliphate, marking the end of the organization's “state” phase. ISIS is now forced to limit itself to smaller-scale terrorist operations, but it has not disappeared or ceased to be a nuisance to Western states and military bases in the region. Until 2025, the Western coalition subcontracted to the Kurds the task of holding 10,000 ISIS fighters and 70,000 women and children of jihadists in huge prison camps, so that Western states could spare themselves the burden of repatriating their nationals who had traveled to Syria to join the terrorist group.

With the fall of the Baathist regime in December 2024, succeeded by the defrocked jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, the United States reoriented its strategy in the region to support the new regime, considered a guarantee of stability. In May 2025, al-Sharaa and Donald Trump met at a summit, and the latter decided to lift sanctions against Syria. As a final step in this normalization process, the Syrian president was removed from the UN Security Council's sanctions list in November 2025 and, a few days later, from the list of individuals considered to be terrorists.

The United States (followed by France and Great Britain) thus gave the new regime carte blanche to reintegrate the de facto autonomous regions, including Rojava, into the central state and its armed forces. On March 10, 2025, an initial agreement was signed between al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, the leader of the SDF, providing for the integration of the AANES into the Syrian state. The SDF's reluctance to lose its autonomy was the immediate cause of the Syrian army's latest victorious offensive in January 2026, which resulted in a 14-point agreement. This agreement reveals the Syrian government's dual objective: politically, it seeks to put an end to all attempts at regional autonomy by imposing strong centralization, barely concealed behind vague promises to recognize Kurdish national rights and grant official status to the Kurdish language. As a result, Kurdish military and police forces will be forced to integrate into the Syrian army and interior ministry. Economically, the agreement allows al-Sharaa to take control of the vast oil and gas fields previously held by the Kurds. Finally, as Tom Barrack points out in the previous quote, the Syrian state will now be responsible for managing prisoners from the Islamic State group.

Once again, the illusion of Kurdish national autonomy within the imperialist framework has run aground on the reefs of realpolitik and shifting alliances among the major powers, for whom local forces are mere pawns to be moved and sacrificed according to the needs of the moment.

THE ONLY WAY FORWARD FOR THE PROLETARIAT AND THE KURDISH MASSES: THE PROLETARIAN CLASS PERSPECTIVE

In Syria, as in Turkey and the rest of the Middle East, the only realistic prospect for the emancipation of the dispossessed masses is now that of proletarian revolution. There can be no doubt that in all these territories, the dominant mode of production for decades has been capitalism. However, the pseudo-revolution in Rojava had nothing to do, either directly or indirectly, with socialist revolution. Even if we were to admit that its supporters sincerely wanted—which is not the case—to establish new relations of production, such a prospect would have been a pure illusion in a single small agricultural region: socialism is not possible in a single province! Instead of retreating to “their” piece of land, communist revolutionaries would have sought to mobilize the entire urban proletariat of the country as a link in an international revolution. Instead of forming popular militias, communist revolutionaries would have formed guards and then a red army, under strict proletarian leadership. Instead of creating a democratic and secular government, revolutionaries would have sought to build the dictatorship of the proletariat, the only solution for moving toward the destruction of capitalism. Instead of seeking the support of imperialist powers, communist revolutionaries would have called on the proletariat of all countries to take up the struggle against their own bourgeoisie, the only real manifestation of international solidarity.

Finally, instead of founding a national—at best, a pan-Kurdish—and nationalist party, communist revolutionaries would have organized themselves into the single party of the proletariat, the internationalist and international class party.

In the absence of such a prospect in Syria in the years 2010-2020, it was inevitable that the Syrian uprising would lead to a series of dead ends, the results of which can now be seen: a renewed Syrian state in the hands of former jihadists and a pseudo-Kurdish revolution that is dying without glory. The lesson that Marxism has drawn from the history of class struggles is clear: there can be no revolutionary situation without proletarian class struggle led by a revolutionary communist party. Syria is just one example among dozens.

Does this mean that the proletariat should ignore the plight of the Kurdish people? Absolutely not. The Kurdish proletariat constitutes an important part of the Turkish proletariat, particularly among emigrants, and is one of the many detachments of this powerful proletarian army called upon to fight against capitalism. In order for the indispensable unity of the proletariat to be achieved, it is vital that the proletariat in countries with a long tradition of oppression of the Kurds—starting with Turkey—fight resolutely against all oppression of the Kurds and for complete equality of rights. This is the essential condition for overcoming the division deliberately maintained by the ruling class and all nationalist parties of the left, right, and far right.

In the imperialist metropolises, this means denouncing the use of the “Kurdish question” for imperialist ends and the bourgeoisie's supposed solidarity with the Kurdish people: bourgeois solidarity is always self-serving and always turns against the proletariat. Real solidarity with the proletariat and the poor masses of the region, Kurds and others, will come from the proletariat when they enter into struggle against “their” state and “their” imperialism.

The proletariat's resumption of its class struggle, from an international perspective and under the leadership of its class party, will point the way toward the ultimate goal: the establishment of communism for the emancipation not only of the Kurds, but of all humanity.

(1) For an example of such statements, see the interview with Turkish MP Tülay Hatimogullari of the pro-Kurdish DEM party in Le Monde on February 1, 2025: https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/02/01/tulay-hatimogullari-la-politique-menee-parankara-en-faveur-de-damas-a-porte-atteinte-aux-negociations-avec-les-kurdes-en-turquie_6664988_3210.html

(2) For more details on Öcalan's surrender in 1999, see our article “The Kurdish Question: Öcalan and the PKK's Offers of Surrender to the Turkish State” in Le Prolétaire, No. 451, November-December 1999. (In French)

(3) See the statement by the TCK (Kurdish Youth Movement) calling for a “revolution” against the PYD: https://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/06/23/statement-by-the-kurdishyouth-movement-tck-about-the-latest-events-in-the-city-of-amouda-and-videos-and-pictures-from-the-protests-and-sit-ins/

(4) Leaflet dated October 3, 2014, from the Libertarian Communist Organization (OCL), quoted in our article “Pro-imperialist mobilization around Kurdistan,” Le Prolétaire No. 513, October–November 2014. (In French)

(5) Details about the protests and their suppression are taken from the English Wikipedia page on the AANES: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Autonomous_Administration_of_North_and_East_Syria

(6) Information on Rojava's economy is taken from Sinan Hatahe, “The Political Economy of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria,” November 29, 2019, available online: https://cadmus.eui.eu/server/api/core/bitstreams/78f2b451-3c5a-5e6b-b58a-399cea8ee3b3/content

(7) See the following report by Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/2503/2015/en/

(8) See Le Monde, January 19, 2026: https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/01/19/en-syrie-la-fin-du-reve-d-autonomie-kurde-au-rojava_6663198_3210.htm%20

(9) For the source of the quote, see Le Monde, January 21, 2026: https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/01/21/en-syrie-legouvernement-accorde-un-delai-aux-kurdes-pour-parvenir-a-un-accord_6663449_3210.html

(10) On October 12, 2015, the United States airdropped fifty tons of ammunition for militias in the region, foremost among them the SDF. A few days later, US President Barack Obama announced that he was sending around fifty special forces soldiers to train and coordinate the SDF. See http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2015/10/30/des-forces-speciales-americaines-envoyees-en-syrie_1410157 and http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2015/11/12/l-etat-islamique-sur-la-defensive_1412972

(11) https://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2018/05/08/en-syrie-la-guerre-tres-speciale-de-la-france_5295972_3218.html

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